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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
This study examines the introduction of legally enforceable Australian Auditing 
Standards (ASAs) and the impact on the audit profession after their first year of 
implementation. This study is informed by regulation theories and potential costs, 
benefits and other impacts of the new regulatory regime identified by the 
Australian government’s April 2006 Regulation Impact Statement (RIS). This 
study collected relevant data through semi-structured in-depth interviews with the 
same key stakeholders as RIS (accounting firms, professional bodies and 
regulatory bodies). The results indicate significant differences to the government’s 
pre-implementation RIS expectations, as well as differences between stakeholder 
groups. Overall the accounting profession does not consider that the extra burden 
of demonstrating compliance with the legally enforceable ASAs has changed the 
audit process or audit outcomes. The auditing profession does not consider the 
extra burden of the new regime justifiable as it has not increased audit quality or 
public confidence, which were the main aims of the government’s regulatory 
intervention. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION, MOTIVATION, AIMS AND 
STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The corporate failures such as HIH, One.Tel in Australia and Worldcom, 
Enron in the US, have once more focused attention on the auditing profession and 
the role of the regulators in protecting the investing public. The underlying theme 
behind the criticism of recent collapses is that financial reporting and auditing 
have ‘gone off the tracks’ (Rouse and Weirich, 2006, p. 25) and that higher 
quality auditing, education and best corporate practices are part of the objectives 
of the government’s intervention behind the introduction of regulatory 
compliance. Given the auditors’ vital role in the financial reporting process and an 
expectation that a properly conducted audit should enable users of the financial 
reports (including regulators, shareholders, policyholders, lenders and other 
creditors) to rely on these with a degree of confidence (HIH Royal Commission, 
2003), it is commonplace for the regulators to react to corporate collapses with 
regulatory reform (Cooper and Deo, 2005). 
Australian government’s justification of the specific regulatory reforms 
adopted in the wake of the corporate collapses was to argue that a stronger 
regulatory environment, (including the newly introduced statutory requirement for 
auditing standards to be legally enforced under the requirements of the 
Corporations Act 2001) will provide a clear public interest focus, and ensure that 
auditing processes and standards are of the highest quality (Regulation Impact 
Statement, April 2006).  
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Given the significant recent changes in the regulatory framework within 
which the auditing profession operates, reforms such as the Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 
(CLERP 9) in Australia and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in the US, there is a 
need for timely research on the costs, benefits and other impacts of the reforms on 
audit practice. The focus of this research is specific to the Australian regulatory 
regime in terms of the introduction of the new legally enforceable Australian 
Auditing Standards (ASAs). 
1.2 MOTIVATION AND AIM 
This research is motivated by the government’s intervention in the regulation 
of the Australian auditing profession by usurping the profession’s traditional role 
in self regulation to one of control through government legislation. CLERP 9 
changed the regulatory framework under which the Australian Auditing Standards 
(ASAs) are issued. As a result under section 336 of the Corporations Act 2001, 
the ASAs are legally enforceable for financial audits commencing 1 July 20061. 
This reorientation of the regulatory framework in Australia has potential 
implications for audit quality, audit practice, and the role of professional 
accounting bodies and the ‘expectations gap’ between users and those that 
undertake audits. 
Implementing the Federal Government’s decision to create legally enforceable 
Auditing Standards will enhance the credibility of audited financial reports in 
Australia and improve investor confidence in the capital markets. 
(Merran Kelsall, AUASB Media Release, 31 August 2005) 
 
                                                 
 
1  Accounting Professional and Ethical Statements (APES) 410 provides that that conformity 
with auditing and assurance standards is mandatory for all other audit engagements, effective 1 
July 2006. 
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The Australian Government’s April 2006 ‘Regulation Impact Statement’ 
addresses the pre-implementation effects of the legislation including perceived 
costs and benefits based on feedback from the affected stakeholders2. In addition, 
the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB) states that it will monitor 
implementation of CLERP 9, by liaising with the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC), Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA), professional accounting bodies and engage in stakeholder enquiry3. 
However, what is unclear from the regulators is when and how a study will be 
conducted examining and assessing the actual consequences of its CLERP 9 and 
legally enforceable ASAs (Jubb and Houghton, 2007).  
Given the silence on the assessment method and timing of the new legislation 
and in the absence of any other systematic evidence, this study will provide much 
needed feedback as to the initial post-implementation impact of the new 
Australian regulatory requirements of the legally enforceable ASAs on the 
auditing profession. The study provides insights from key professional 
stakeholders (accounting firms, professional bodies, regulatory bodies), into how 
the auditing profession has dealt with the new regulatory regime in its first year of 
implementation.  
The divergence in views and perceptions of different stakeholders to the new 
regulatory regime is reflected in the Federal Government’s claim “that the 
profession was no longer capable of setting its own standards to protect the 
                                                 
 
2  All new Australian government regulation proposals undergo a preliminary assessment with 
the detailed analysis documented in a Regulation Impact Statement (RIS). 
3  RIS, April 2006, p. 10 stipulates that will be a second phase of reviewing the Auditing 
Standards under a monitoring and review process, one of which regular consultative meeting 
with key stakeholders. Further details are not provided as to when and the exact format of the 
review. 
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public” (Jubb and Houghton, 2007, p. 19), whilst on the other hand Clarke and 
Dean (2007, p. 85) note that “recent reforms to auditing practices create the 
impression that problems lie with the audit profession”, as opposed to the defects 
in the accounting data that auditors audit. The data provided by this study of the 
varying perspectives of different stakeholders is critical given the complex issues 
and debates surrounding the effectiveness of government regulation of financial 
auditing especially in view of Australia and France being unique in applying force 
of law auditing standards. The study’s timeframe of one year post-implementation 
of the new legislation aims to provide critical insight into the profession’s initial 
perceptions of the main impacts, benefits, costs and actual outcomes of the new 
legislation for audit practice to date. 
Research to date relating to current standard-setting is relatively scarce (Dick 
and Walton, 2007), descriptive in nature and confined to examining institutional 
arrangements for standard setting in Australia (Jones et al., 2004), regulatory 
relationships (Willman et al., 2003), external auditor and corporate governance 
(Holm and Laursen, 2007), structure of standard setting (Brown and Tarca, 2001), 
political process of standard setting (Walker, 1987) and a conceptual framework 
for accounting standards (Booth and Cocks, 1990). In contrast, this exploratory 
study investigates the various stakeholder views of the new regulatory regime and 
compliments the CPA Australia survey (2006)4 and the RIS (April 2006). The 
current study focuses on post-implementation impact qualitative data as presently 
there is “no accepted method to quantify the costs and benefits of auditing 
standard-setting” (RIS, April 2006, p. 4) given the relatively short post 
                                                 
 
4  CPA Australia 2006 Survey focused on the perceptions of members on the impact of CLERP 9 
reform on auditing and public confidence pre-implementation of the legal ASAs. 
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implementation period and the complexity of the concurrent introduction of other 
regulations such as quality control of accounting firms (Accounting Professional 
and Ethical Standards (APES) 312), independence requirements (APES 110) and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). This study is relevant in an 
Australian and international context for accounting firms, professional bodies, 
standard-setters and regulators in view of a number of other jurisdictions (e.g. 
South Africa) which are currently reviewing their financial reporting and auditing 
frameworks and exploring the possible introduction of a similar regulatory 
regime.  
Therefore the aim of this research is to provide insights into the impact of the 
introduction of the CLERP 9 audit regulation, and in particular the new force of 
law ASAs under section 336 of the Corporations Act 2001 on the audit profession. 
Australian standard-setters argue that a stronger regulatory environment 
(including the newly introduced statutory requirement for ASAs to be legally 
enforced under the requirements of the Corporations Act 2001), will provide a 
clear public focus interest, and ensure that auditing processes and standards are of 
the highest quality. Hence this study builds upon and compliments the 
investigative pre-implementation RIS (April 2006) conducted by the Australian 
Government and examines the post-implementation impact on the audit 
profession after the first audit period under the new regulatory regime. This 
exploratory study is timely given lack of any other systematic post-
implementation data. The data collected will make a significant contribution to the 
regulator’s and audit profession’s understanding of the effects on the key 
stakeholders and provide useful guidance in relation to actual costs, benefits and 
other operational impacts.  
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1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
This study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 examines the relevant literature 
on regulation theory. Chapter 3 outlines the research questions stemming from the 
RIS (April 2006) and also analyses the initial stakeholder reactions to the 
proposed legislation. Chapter 4 provides the detail of the research methodology 
adopted. Chapter 5 presents the results, analysis and discussion. Chapter 6 
concludes the thesis by identifying research limitations and potential future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the extant literature on regulation theory within the 
perspectives of ‘public interest’ theory, ‘capture or interest group’ theory and the 
‘economic’ theory of regulation. Regulation theory informs the current research 
investigating the ‘impact of the new legally enforceable auditing standards on 
Australian audit practice’5 as it addresses the purpose of regulation, who benefits 
from regulation, what form the regulation will take place, and provides basis for 
analysis of other regulation issues such as interactions between regulatory parties.  
The theories discussed in this chapter provide the framework for the broad 
based analysis on the economic, social and political influences involved in the 
regulation process (Godfrey et al., 2006) with a specific focus on the regulatory 
process of Australian audit standard setting and its implementation into practice. 
The questions of particular interest to this research are why and how has the 
regulation emerged and its impact on audit practice, what actions have audit firms 
taken to ensure compliance with the standards and has the new regime achieved 
the regulator’s objective of improved audit quality? 
This review begins with the views on regulation definitions and concepts in 
section 2.2. Section 2.3 examines selected theories in order to gain an 
understanding into the behaviour and responses of parties engaged in the  
                                                 
 
5  On 1 July 2004 the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB), was reconstituted as a 
Commonwealth body under the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) Act. 
Australia’s new legally enforceable Auditing Standards were issued by the AUASB and are 
operative for financial reporting periods commencing 1 July 2006. 
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regulatory process. ‘Public Interest’ theory is reviewed in section 2.3.1, ‘Capture 
or Interest Group’ theory is reviewed in section 2.3.2 and ‘Economic’ theory in 
section 2.3.3. These theories have been identified as critical to the understanding 
of why regulation takes on various approaches. The theories are extended in 
section 2.3.4 to facilitate understanding of the emergence of various other 
institutional approaches to regulation and section 2.4 summarises the literature in 
the context of standard setting within the Australian financial reporting and 
auditing framework. Concluding comments on regulation, research and theories 
are summarised in section 2.5. 
2.2 DEFINITION OF REGULATION  
Regulation generally suggests some form of action that restricts behaviour 
and prevents the occurrence of undesirable activities. The literature to date does 
not provide a concrete definition but presents many views and perspectives on 
regulation. The range of definitions is outlined below. 
Mitnick (1982) asserts a simple definition of regulation as the ‘intentional 
restriction of a subject’s choice of activity by an entity not directly or partly 
involved in that activity’. He provides this view to present his perspective that 
regulation is a process of both the public and private entities, hence a co-
regulatory process. This was the case in Australia pre-CLERP 9 with the 
accounting profession engaging in a ‘co-regulatory framework for audit standard 
setting’ (Jubb and Houghton, 2007). 
Baldwin and Cave (1999) deal with regulation as a discrete mode of 
government activity. They identify regulation with a specific set of commands 
such as a binding set of rules, similar in nature to rules in the Corporations Act 
2001 under specific sections dealing with auditor independence. Baldwin and 
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Cave (1999) extend their views on regulation to a ‘deliberate state influence’ 
designed to influence industrial and social behaviour. Puxty et al. (1987) theorise 
regulation as a combination of ‘market, state and community’. This broader view 
of regulation, encompassing all forms of social control and influence, has 
relevance to Australia’s current financial reporting regulation framework 
consisting of government regulatory bodies such as AUASB, ASIC, APRA, 
FRC6, in addition to the legislative requirements of the Corporation Act 2001.  
The role of law as an instrument of social control within regulation, that is, 
shaping social behaviour (Morgan and Yeung, 2007) is relevant to the Australian 
regulators and their decision to provide legal backing for ASAs, thus making it 
easier to enforce the standards and also be seen to act in public interest by 
articulating the collective goals of the community, that is, increasing the quality of 
audit and reliability of financial information. Den Hertog (2000, p. 223) also 
defines regulation as the employment of “legal instruments for the implementation 
of social-economic policy objectives”. The behaviour can, in his view, only really 
be altered with legal sanctions. According to this legal perspective, regulation 
should not be viewed in negative terms as it is seen to facilitate and enable 
activities (Gaffikin, 2005) which for example may include a ban on handheld 
mobile phones whilst driving; a rule for safe driving. Under this perspective 
regulation is seen as the capacity for standard setting, information gathering and 
behaviour modification used by government in order to change the state of the 
system (Den Hertog, 2000; Gaffikin, 2005; Morgan and Yeung, 2007). 
                                                 
 
6  The Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB), Australian Securities Investment 
Commission (ASIC), Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC). Abbreviations: see page x. 
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Social regulation (Gerboth, 1973; Joskow, 1976; Solomons, 1978; Joskow 
and Noll, 1981) views regulation as a political process with the success of the 
process reliant on public confidence. Social regulation is concerned with the 
environment, occupational health and safety, consumer protection and so forth 
supporting the positive view of regulation (Gaffikin, 2005). A number of authors 
(Noll, 1989; Joskow and Noll, 1981; Peltzman, 1979; Stigler, 1971) suggest that 
economic regulation such as regulation of prices, entry conditions into a market or 
industry is ineffective as it is subject to political constraints. The political 
economy of regulation adds not only to the views of economic regulation but 
more importantly highlights the consequences of regulation and attempts to find 
that optimal approach to regulation.  
Bator’s (1958), Selznick’s (1973) and Breyer’s (1982), notion of regulation as 
a sustained and focused control over activities that are valued by the community is 
closely linked to the Australian Government’s intentions in introducing 
regulation. The Australian government’s stated primary objective of any corporate 
regulation is to facilitate the achievement of a range of community objectives 
without creating unnecessary burdens on business or the community7. This also 
illustrates Gerboth’s (1975) and Becker’s (1983, 1986) stance that regulation is 
more than just a set of commands; influence plays a major part and only 
politically responsible institutions have the right to command others to obey rules. 
Regulation viewed from this political perspective raises questions such as; what 
was the reason for government regulation of the accounting and audit market, 
what purpose and whose interests are being served, what are the costs and benefits  
                                                 
 
7  Office of Best Practice Regulation definition <http://www.obpr.gov.au/reform.html>accessed 
October 2007. 
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of any new regulation and has the regulation fulfilled its collective goals 
(Gerboth, 1975; Mitnick, 1980; Mitnick 1982; Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Godfrey 
et al., 2006; Morgan and Yeung, 2007)? 
The preceding notions of regulation highlight different reasons for justifying 
regulation, however according to Gaffikin (2005); it is a combination of these 
reasons that leads to regulation. Given the lack of a concrete definition of 
regulation in the literature to date, this study defines ‘regulation’ as “to regulate in 
essence is to control, guide according to authority that has the force of law” 
(Merriam Webster Dictionary, 2004). 
The regulation theories analysed in the next section assist in the analysis of 
the social, political and economic influences in the regulatory process (Gaffikin, 
2005; Godfrey et al., 2006). This is essential to the understanding the change 
regulation brings, which actors contribute to the change, why regulation emerges 
in its current form and whether and to what extent it has achieved its goals. 
2.3 REGULATION THEORIES 
The three main theories overlap (Majone, 1997; Majone, 1999; Den Hertog, 
2000; Cooper and Deo, 2005; Gaffikin, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2006; Morgan and 
Yeung, 2007), in terms of providing reasons for government regulatory 
intervention and who will benefit from this intervention. In addition the regulation 
theories provide the framework for exploring the relationship between regulation 
(introduction of legally enforceable auditing standards in Australia), the various 
groups participating in, and affected by the new regulatory regime (that is, 
accounting firms, professional and regulatory bodies). The literature review on 
regulation theories encompasses numerous labels such as; ‘public interest 
theories’ (Becker, 1983), the ‘Chicago theory’ (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1979; 
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Becker, 1983; Becker 1986), ‘public choice theory’ (Posner, 1974; Den Hertog, 
2000), ‘regulatory capture’ (Walker, 1987; Laffont and Tirole, 1990; Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993; Laffont, 1999), ‘economic theory’ (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974; 
Becker, 1983; Peltzman et al.,1989), ‘political-economic’ theories (Joskow, 1976; 
Joskow and Noll, 1981; Laffont and Tirole, 1990; Puxty et al., 1987) and many 
more. Nevertheless, the various viewpoints have a common purpose, which is to 
explain the rationale and need for regulation and are further explored in sections 
2.3.1 to 2.3.4.  
Appendix A provides a comprehensive summary of the key perspectives and 
relevant research in the area of regulation. 
2.3.1 PUBLIC INTEREST THEORY OF REGULATION 
According to the proponents of this theory its purpose is to achieve publicly 
desired results which, ‘if left to the market, would not be attained’ (Bator, 1958; 
Gaffikin, 2005). This theory provides the reason for government intervention in 
regulation as regulation is pursued for public (that is, general public) as opposed 
to private interests. Arrow (1970) and Shubik (1970) state that government 
regulation is the instrument to overcome the disadvantages of imperfect 
competition and undesirable market results. In essence, public interest 
government intervention negates the tensions between private corporations and 
the general public as far as the inefficiencies in information disclosure, misleading 
accounting numbers, the monopoly of control over information by managers 
(Belkaoui and Jones, 1996) and other corporate shortfalls in reporting to the 
general investing public. The use of public interest theory has been popular in 
explaining regulation practices and origins given that “regulation in the past and 
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even today always followed some form of crisis or public dissent” (Uche, 2001, 
p. 68). The introduction and justification of government introduced CLERP 
reform to “modernise business regulation and foster a healthy and vibrant 
economy”8 after corporate collapses such as HIH and One.Tel can be legitimised 
by the public interest theory. 
The concept of market failure (Bator, 1958; Posner, 1974; Mitnick, 1980; 
Ramsey, 1985; Godfrey et al., 2006) is often considered to be the reason for 
government to intervene as a response to the public’s demand for corrections to 
inefficient markets (Gaffikin, 2005). Hence there is the assumption that the 
market has imperfections (Bator, 1958; Posner, 1974; Mitnick, 1980; Breyer, 
1982; Cooper and Keim, 1983) and failures such as unrestrained competition, lack 
of competition, imperfect information gaps, are not the best conditions for a 
competitive market and are not in consumers best interests (Godfrey et al., 2006). 
The underlying argument is that the government is ‘objective’ and that this type of 
democratic reform at the request of ‘public interest’ agents is necessary and 
beneficial to the public (Gaffikin, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2006). Further underlying 
assumptions of this theory is that markets are fragile, inefficient and if left alone, 
result in inequitable outcomes for the public (Breyer, 1982), and that government 
regulation is virtually costless (Mitnick, 1980). This is because government 
regulation is viewed as effective and can be implemented without great costs to 
society (Posner, 1974). Godfrey et al. (2006) further assert that the general 
public’s concerns are translated to legislative action, which in turn provides the 
notion that votes are seen as a form of currency. This leads to such questions as to 
                                                 
 
8  Treasurer Peter Costello in the second reading, Thursday 4 December 2003, House of 
Representatives debate. Accessed October 2007. 
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whether the intervening government regulators can act in an objective manner to 
serve the best interests of the public? 
The critics of the public interest theory (Stigler, 1971; Walker, 1987; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978; Peltzman, 1979; and others) argue that regulators respond 
not only to ‘public interest’, but other influences such as economic, political and 
other private interest groups that determine the form of regulation. These 
alternative theories are outlined in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. Section 2.4 brings 
public interest theory back under the microscope in the context of accounting and 
auditing standard setting. 
2.3.2 CAPTURE OR INTEREST GROUP THEORY OF REGULATION 
This theory extends and builds upon public interest theory, in that interest 
groups ‘battle’ for control of the government’s coercive powers to achieve their 
desired wealth gains (Gaffikin, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2006). The theory assumes 
that public interest underlies the start of the regulation and broadens (Posner, 
1974; Walker, 1987; Den Hertog, 2000) it by exploring the relationships between 
various groups and the government, the extent of various groups’ capture of the 
regulation process. Posner (1974), Stigler (1971), Mitnick (1980) and Walker 
(1987) describe ‘interest groups’ and ‘capture theories’9 and suggest that 
regulators respond to the demands of special interest groups. Stigler (1971) has 
been instrumental in questioning the effectiveness and legitimisation of regulation 
under public interest theory and he suggests that “regulation is acquired by the 
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit” (Stigler, 1971, 
                                                 
 
9  There are variations in the literature regarding the types of regulation theories and names used. 
In this study the theories of ‘interest group and capture’ are combined, as they are both 
describe the competing groups that shape the form of regulation. 
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p. 3). He challenges the ‘public interest’ origin for government intervention and 
argues that interest groups capturing the regulators are out to increase their own 
wealth and credibility. Stigler (1971) extends the capture theory analysis of 
regulation to include models and predictors of regulation under the economic 
theory of regulation outlined in section 2.3.3. 
Mitnick (1980) states that ‘capture’ occurs if the regulated ‘interest’ controls 
the regulation and the regulatory agency; or if the regulated parties succeed in 
co-ordinating the regulatory body’s activities with their own activities so that their 
private interest is satisfied. This approach suggests that regulation is a competition 
for power, rather than just for public interest. Walker (1987, 1993) explores this 
suggesting that regulatory capture occurred in Australia when the Accounting 
Standards Review Board (ASRB) was ‘captured’ by the accounting profession, 
hence the regulatee (profession) dominated the regulator (ASRB). Posner (1974) 
also notes that the regulator’s original purpose of protecting public interest is 
somewhat diluted through the efforts of the interest group. The influences of 
interest groups as described by the capture/interest group theory are evident 
throughout the history of the accounting standard setting process and this includes 
regulators, who too act in self-interested ways (Brown and Tarca, 2001).  
Makkai and Braithwaite (1995) describe the ‘revolving door phenomenon’ 
where regulators may become captives of industry because former industry 
employees take influential positions in the government agencies whose job it is to 
regulate that industry. This approach to capture suggests a multi-dimensional 
concept that is not a product of the regulation process but a contingent process 
that arises in certain situations. Nevertheless, “all over the world there is a 
concern that governments are captured by organised business interests” (Mitchell 
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et al., 2001, p. 3). According to Posner (1974) and Stigler (1971) and the public 
interest and capture theory are incomplete theories of regulation, as ‘theories’ 
should be able to predict which industries should be regulated and as to which 
form it will take place; whether it be government or self regulation by the 
profession. 
Under this approach to regulation the Australian professional accounting 
bodies (Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA), CPA Australia 
(CPA), National Institute of Accountants (NIA), Institute of Internal Auditors 
(IIA)), and corporations, will aim to influence the setting of accounting and 
auditing standards governing their members (Godfrey et al., 2006). This may 
mean a formal approach, lobbying through the exposure draft process or 
representation on the relevant standard setting boards. Figure 1 builds upon 
Brown and Tarca’s (2001) work, in illustrating the influential groups in the 
regulation of financial reporting and auditing activity in Australia. The complexity 
of the relationships shows that certain interest groups take on various roles. For 
example ASX is seen as a regulator and supplier of regulation, as well as being 
subjected to regulation from ASIC; given it too is a corporation. The professional 
bodies are represented in all three categories of interest groups as although they 
no longer have responsibility for issuing accounting and auditing standards; they 
still regulate their members.  
The capture theory has relevance for standard setting in Australia given that 
regulation of auditing financial statements has been taken away from the 
professional bodies by government and the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) is emerging as a dominant supplier of regulation (see 
Figure 1). This is further discussed in section 2.4.2. 
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Figure 1: Relationships of Various Interest Groups in the Current 
Australian Financial Reporting and Auditing Regulatory 
Environment 
Figure adapted from Brown and Tarca’s (2001). 
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2.3.3 ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION 
The positive or economic theory of regulation10 has emerged from the 
Chicago11 school of thought, with Stigler (1971) as its pioneer. He provides a 
theoretical foundation from which to challenge the views that regulation is for the 
benefit of the public at large or some large sub-class of the public. Unlike the 
public interest proponents, Stigler (1971) states that regulation is not directed to 
fix market failures, ‘but at setting up income transfers in favour of the industries 
in exchange for political support’ (Den Hertog, 2000).  
The premise of Stigler’s (1971) arguments and his followers (Posner, 1974; 
Peltzman, 1979; Becker, 1986) is that the government has the power to coerce, 
and regulation is a tool/commodity that is ‘sold’ by politicians and ‘bought’ by the 
most powerful interest groups. The behaviour of legislators is driven by their 
desire to remain in office. Peltzman (1979) models assume that politicians will 
choose their policy of regulation to maximise political support; the reason why 
this economic theory is also referred to in the literature as ‘public choice’ theory 
(Den Hertog, 2000; Gaffikin, 2005). Advocates of this perspective argue that 
agents are rational and self-interested. In contrast to public interest theory, 
regulation is supplied in response to those groups who are able to coordinate their 
powers for further wealth to themselves at the expense of others (Stigler, 1971; 
Peltzman, 1979; Joskow and Noll, 1981). To this effect regulation is viewed as a 
                                                 
 
10  Gaffikin (2005) asserts that this type of theory has many variations in name; private interest 
theory, public choice theory, captures theory and special interest theory. This research has 
elected to place capture theory in with interest group theory as both imply the government 
having a reactive role to regulation. 
11  Peltzman et al. (1989) also refers to the theory of economic regulation as ‘The Chicago Theory 
of Regulation’. 
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means of redistributing wealth from those with “less political power to those with 
more” (Wilson, 1980, p. 373). 
Stigler (1971) does not explain how much regulation has also benefited 
consumers (Peltzman, 1979), or address a notion of maximising political support 
by allocating benefits of regulation among various groups participating in the 
regulatory process. Peltzman (1979), Becker (1983), Joskow and Rose (1989), 
Noll (1989), Joskow and Noll (1981) have all extended the work of Stigler (1971) 
to suggest that regulation may be sought by an industry or it may be thrust upon it. 
All put forth models as approaches to predict which industries will be regulated, 
who will benefit, who will be burdened with the regulation, what form it will take 
and the effects of regulation upon resource allocation. 
Becker’s (1986) approach focuses on the competition between interest 
groups, and develops a model that tests whether the role of the legislator is 
suppressed. Becker’s (1986) model provides some credibility to the assumption 
that regulation is used to increase the welfare of the most influential interest 
groups. Both Becker (1983) and Peltzman (1979), suggest that regulation is still 
most likely when there is the presence of market failure (Den Hertog, 2000; 
Gaffikin, 2005) and that regulation is efficient subject to political constraints.  
The evidence as to the power of economic theory to explain regulatory 
developments and deregulation since the 1980s is mixed. The economic theory 
approach to regulation has encountered issues with respect to the efficiency of the 
models as interest groups cannot control the activities of the regulators as they are 
restricted with information access (Becker, 1983; Majone, 1997), regulation tends 
to dissipate wealth by generating inefficiencies (Peltzman et al., 1989), and 
regulation may result in government contributing to market failure (Den Hertog, 
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2000; Uche, 2000; Cooper and Deo, 2005). Nevertheless this approach to 
regulation is consistent with the assumption that all actors in the regulation 
process are maximisers of their own welfare. The regulation is seen to be the 
product of the interactions between regulators, the regulated parties and the wider 
community. However, analysing who benefits from the regulation economically 
and who carries the cost of regulation, may not explain the cause of regulation. 
Furthermore, in the models there is little attention placed on the following issues; 
motivation and behaviour of the various interest groups, and ways in which the 
legislators and regulators conform to the wishes of the interest groups (Joskow 
and Noll, 1981; Majone, 1999; Den Hertog, 2000; Gaffikin, 2005).  
2.3.4 INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL-ECONOMIC THEORIES OF REGULATION  
A group of regulation theorists, who reject the previous economic rational 
actor model for regulation, argue that the institutional structure, arrangements, as 
well as the social processes shape regulation. These ‘Institutionalist’ writers 
analyse regulatory interactions not just at the individual actor level (Baldwin and 
Cave, 1990) but claim that there is much more than individuals’ preferences that 
motivate regulation and focus on the interactions between the legal systems, 
economic systems and the political systems (Tinker, 1984; Baldwin and Cave, 
1996; Den Hertog, 2000; Cooper and Deo, 2005; Gaffikin, 2005; Morgan and 
Yeung, 2007). 
Institutional theory from social-legal literature draws on agency theory and 
how information asymmetry needs to be taken into consideration when designing 
regulation procedures (Majone, 1999; McCubbins et al., 1989). In contrast 
researchers from a political science perspective, concentrate on the ways in which 
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political structures, institutions and decision-making processes shape political 
outcomes (Baldwin and Cave, 1996). There are other social factors that need to be 
included in the analysis of regulation and Tinker (1984) contends that there are 
many inequalities among social classes arising from access to markets and 
information, and hence there is a need for regulation to protect them and capital 
markets. 
In contrast Puxty et al. (1987, p. 275) narrows the focus to accounting 
regulation amongst four countries and concludes that regulation is shaped 
according to the “contrasting histories, cultures and paths of development of 
different nation states”. The focus is on the market, state and community and that 
regulation goes beyond the economic approach (Peltzman et al., 1989; Peltzman 
1979; Stigler, 1971) and should reflect a broad based approach to cultural and 
societal issues. Gaffikin (2005) and Den Hertog (2000) assert that this view has 
implications for standard setting; how the profession operates, nature of the 
regulatory framework, perceptions of social responsibilities and ethical behaviour. 
2.4 THEORIES OF REGULATION IN CONTEXT OF AUSTRALIAN 
STANDARD SETTING 
All the theories reviewed in section 2.3 attempt to explain the pattern of 
government regulation (Posner, 1974) and the effects on the different players in 
the market. This in turn raises the predominant issue with the accounting and audit 
standard setting process as to whether it should take the form of self regulation by 
the accounting profession or regulation by the public sector (Walker, 1987; 
Walker and Robinson, 1994; Gaffikin, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2006). ‘Self-
Regulation Theory’ informs that success in this regulation approach will occur 
when the professional body can effectively oversee and enforce the activities of its 
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members. Jubb and Houghton (2007) claim that the Australian government by 
taking away audit standard setting from the profession has in fact implied that the 
profession has failed in enforcement of credibility in standard setting. This view 
has been enhanced by the involvement of accountants in corporate collapses, 
business fraud and lack of auditor independence (Gaffikin, 2005).  
2.4.1 PUBLIC INTEREST THEORY  
Given that public interest theory has the underlying assumption of market 
failure and the need for government intervention to correct the market 
inefficiencies (Peltzman et al., 1979; Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Croley, 2000), the 
Australian government’s arrangement of the ASRB (in 1984) and the 
reconstitution of the AUASB (2004) as statutory bodies to provide legally 
enforceable accounting and auditing standards respectively, is seen as justified. 
The market failure and inefficiency is evidenced on a number of fronts; namely 
failure in the market for accounting information (Godfrey et al., 2006), failure in 
corporate disclosure of financial performance (Clarke and Dean, 2007), and 
failure in the accounting profession to self regulate (Jubb and Houghton, 2007). 
According to Godfrey et al. (2006), the public interest theory provides the reason 
for the origin of Australian government intervention into regulating the standard 
setting process, given its purpose was to serve the general public interest, which in 
turn will be evidenced by the return of investor confidence in the capital markets. 
This view alludes to protection of the general public and is supported by the 
AUASB Strategic Corporate Plan: 
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AUASB should develop Australian Auditing Standards that have a clear public 
interest focus and are of the highest quality, to maintain investor confidence in 
the Australian economy (including its capital markets) 
(AUASB Corporate Plan, 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2009) 
 
This approach to standard setting assumes that government regulation is 
effective and can be implemented without great cost (Posner, 1974; Den Hertog, 
2000), that it seeks the protection and benefit of the public at large (Hantke-
Domas, 2003) from the negative impacts of harmful business behaviour. Baker 
(2005) also states that public interest protects investors and creditors in capital 
markets. Gaffikin (2005), Godfrey et al. (2006) and Clarke and Dean (2007) also 
provide the alternative to more government regulation by stating that accounting 
and disclosure by corporations needs to be strengthened before the costs of 
government intervention are executed. 
2.4.2 CAPTURE OR INTEREST GROUP THEORY  
According to the capture theory the accounting profession and its standard 
setting regime was also devised to protect public interest under the Accounting 
Standards Review Board (ASRB). The Peirson Report (1990) recommended that 
the government relinquish substantial control of the standard setting process and 
that the profession continues to be self-regulated. However Jones et al. (2004) and 
Walker (1987), argue that this regulatory body was captured by the accounting 
profession it was supposed to regulate. Walker (1987, 1993) portrayed the 
accounting profession as not accountable to the public, but orchestrating control 
of the standard setting process for its own gain. This was achieved in a number of 
ways; the accounting profession needed to legitimise accounting standards and 
compliance, and it did so by retaining an interest in the process through the 
Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF). Currently, as a result of 
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CLERP 9, audit standard setting is now a government-controlled process. 
However, the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and 
the role of the IASB, has highlighted the possibility that the IASB has now 
captured the standard setting process and its influences are seen in the diminishing 
role of Australian standard setters in the ‘international standard setting arena’ 
(Simnett, 2007; Brown and Tarca, 2001). Similarly, the adoption of International 
Auditing Standards (ISAs) promulgated by IASB can also be seen as diminishing 
the role of the AUASB to merely ‘rubber stamping’ the IASs as ASAs with some 
minor changes to ensure compliance with specific Australian legislative 
requirements. 
2.4.3 ECONOMIC THEORY 
Rahman (1988) extends on the capture of the ASRB by the accounting 
profession as exposed by Walker (1987), by suggesting that the influence on 
standard setting has come from a number of groups, namely political, such as the 
Ministerial Council, ASIC, company executives on the ASRB, and that it was in 
essence the corporate sector that was the regulated industry. From this view, 
Rahman (1988) debates that the accounting profession did not capture the 
standard setting process (Godfrey et al., 2006). Furthermore, international 
harmonisation has changed the ability of various parties to influence, control or 
capture the standard setting process. 
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2.5 CONCLUDING COMMENTS  
This chapter has outlined the various theories and definitions of regulation in 
order to explain the reasons behind government intervention. The three key 
theories outlined in this chapter focus attention on various groups of actors to try 
to explain the purpose, the need for and the various approaches to regulation. 
Gaffikin (2005, p. 9) states that “there is not only market failure but theory 
failure” as none of the theories can really explain whether the market for financial 
information, corporate disclosure, and performance in the capital markets has 
improved as a result of government intervention in regulation. Nevertheless, 
Clarke and Dean (2007) and Gaffikin (2005) make the point that no amount of 
theory or government regulation will prevent some people in engaging in 
unethical behaviour. The major cases of business fraud and spectacular corporate 
collapses will no doubt continue to ensure the demand from the public for 
accounting regulation (Gaffikin, 2005). 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop the research questions based on the 
various theories of regulation reviewed in Chapter 2. The CLERP 9 legislation 
(CLERP, 2003; CLERP, 2004), the RIS (April 2006), and public reports also 
relevant to the development of research questions are outlined below in sections 
3.2 to 3.4. 
3.2 CLERP 9 LEGISLATION 
CLERP 9 changed the framework under which ASAs are issued. CLERP 9 
continued the government’s reform agenda under Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program Act 1999 to modernise business regulation, “progressing the 
principles of market freedom, investor protection and quality disclosure of 
relevant information to the market” (Treasurer Peter Costello12).  
The AUASB was reconstituted under the CLERP Act and is now charged 
with the responsibility of issuing ASAs, which became legally enforceable (under 
section 336, Corporations Act 2001) for audits for financial reporting periods 
commencing 1 July 2006. The move from a self-regulatory regime to a 
government-controlled standard setting process was the result of much debate 
along with the Australian government’s perception that the accounting profession 
was no longer capable of setting its own standards and thus they needed to step in 
and protect the public (Jubb and Houghton, 2007). This view is supported by 
                                                 
 
12  House of Representatives, Official Hansard, Thursday, 4 December 2003, first reading of the 
proposed CLERP bill, p. 23761. 
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others (Gaffikin, 2005; Gaffikin, 2006;Clarke and Dean, 2007) that question the 
appropriateness of self-regulation by the profession at a time when the profession 
was criticised in respect of independence, conflicts of interests and their member’s 
roles in various corporate collapses. 
The Australian approach to standard setting pre-CLERP 9, in contrast to the 
US rules-based approach to corporate regulation was predominantly based on 
principles of a self-regulation regime with minimal and piecemeal legislative 
requirements. Given that principles are open to interpretation and hence very 
difficult to enforce (Jeffrey Lucy, ASIC, 2007), the problem of enforcement was 
evident (Gaffikin, 2006; Treasurer Peter Costello13). Thus the government’s 
regulatory intervention was not surprising, as one of the government’s main 
objectives in passing CLERP 9 was to promote the enforceability of auditing 
standards to allow for better enforcement of financial reporting and auditing 
requirements. 
The government justified its intervention of both forming and enforcing 
regulation of financial reporting under CLERP 9 by reflecting both it’s policy 
initiatives and public expectations (Godfrey et al., 2006) as a response to 
corporate collapses, recommendations in the Ramsey Report 2001, HIH Royal 
Commission (2003) and investor demand for more transparent accounting. The 
specific stated intent of introducing CLERP 9 reforms and legally enforceable 
ASAs was to: 
• provide a clear public focus  
• demonstrate a high quality in standard setting, and 
                                                 
 
13  House of Representatives, Official Hansard, Thursday, 4 December 2003, first reading of the 
proposed CLERP bill, p. 23761. 
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• to conform with International Standards of Auditing. 
CLERP 9 also expanded the role of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to 
include: oversight of the auditing standard setting arrangements; advising, 
monitoring and reporting on auditor independence issues; promoting and advising 
on the adequacy of the teaching of professional and business ethics; and 
monitoring and assessing the adequacy of the disciplinary procedures of the 
professional accounting bodies (FRC media release, 2003). As a result of this new 
direction in standard setting, the AUASB’s strategic direction comes from the 
FRC whose membership consists of key stakeholders from the business and 
investing communities, the professional accounting bodies, governments, and 
regulatory agencies.  
Given the FRC’s strategic direction issued to the AUASB on 6 April 2005 
(RIS, April 2006) to develop ASAs that ‘have a clear public interest focus’, it is 
clear that ‘public interest theory’ appears to be the dominant theory behind the 
government’s justification of regulatory intervention which was considered 
necessary to nurture public interest and public confidence after the market failures 
of corporate collapses. 
3.3 ASIC AND CORPORATIONS LAW 
The Australian government’s motivation in introducing the force of law 
auditing standards was to significantly enhance the rigour of the standards 
applying to the auditing profession and to improve ASIC’s enforcement 
capabilities. ASIC is an independent government body set up to enforce and 
administer the Australian Corporations Act 2001, under the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act). ASIC’s core responsibility is 
market confidence and a commitment to better regulation of corporate financial 
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information (ASIC, 2002) and public confidence in the auditing process is 
considered to be vital to the efficient functioning of Australia’s capital markets. 
ASIC Chairman, Jeffrey Lucy, states that a high quality and independent audit 
process is crucial to the operation of a fair and efficient market, where we have 
confident and informed investors (ASIC, 2006). Consequently, the role of ASIC 
extends to reviews of the audit firms and quality of audits, monitoring adherence 
to the particular rules and standards in the Corporations Act. The introduction of 
force of law ASAs capable of enforcement, thus enhance ASIC’s role and its 
responsibility in ensuring high quality audits. 
In addition to the ASIC reviews, the Audit Quality Review Board (AQRB)14 
review is designed to gain a reasonable level of assurance that the firm has in 
place, in relation to its audits of listed companies, systems and processes that are 
effective in ensuring compliance with applicable professional standards and legal 
obligations regarding independence and audit quality. Unlike the ASIC review 
and outcomes that are made public, the AQRB reviews are reported back to firms 
and the professional bodies. Given ASIC’s enhanced role with CLERP 9 and the 
ASAs as legal instruments, there is some concern within the audit profession 
about ASIC’s role, the implications of the reviews and potential duplication of 
reviews by bodies such as AQRB. 
                                                 
 
14  AQRB was set up in February 2006 to complement other existing review processes undertaken 
by the professional bodies – the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, the National 
Institute of Accountants and CPA Australia – and the surveillance activities of ASIC. AQRB is 
focused on the quality of audit and independence processes of the participating firms’ audits of 
listed entities. Its work reviews the effectiveness of firm wide systems that assist the firm and 
its auditors to comply with all the relevant codes and rules. The AQRB work aims to enhance 
overall effectiveness of firm processes and encourage the continual improvement of auditing 
practice (AQRB website, accessed October 2007). 
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3.4 ANALYSIS OF REGULATION IMPACT STATEMENT APRIL 2006 
Prior to any new regulation being implemented, the government releases a 
RIS detailing whether the impact of the new regulation on business is warranted 
and efficient. The RIS addressing the introduction of the new legally enforceable 
ASAs was released in April 2006, providing feedback from the affected 
stakeholders including representations from the audit profession, regulators, 
business and standard setters which are summarised in Figure 2. The public 
comments are summarised in Table 1 (AUASB Exposure Draft Comments, 
Groups 1 to 5, 2005). 
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Figure 2:  RIS (April 2006) Respondents and the Key Stakeholder Groups 
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Table 1: Summary of Stakeholder Pre-implementation Comments on the 
Impact of Legally Enforceable ASAs 
 
STAKEHOLDERS SUMMARISED RESPONSES 
REGULATORS • Clear public interest focus 
• ASAs are of high quality 
• Conform with ISAs 
• Mandatory requirements in bold to denote authority 
• ‘Should’ change to ‘Shall’ 
• Little compliance costs to audit firms 
• Most comments on wording of Exposure Drafts 
• Clarity on the auditor’s obligations 
 
PROFESSIONAL BODIES • Generally supportive of ASA as legal instruments 
• Increase in technical bulletins to members 
• Clarity important to legal enforceability 
• Dramatic changes to standards not in public interest 
• Concerned with SME impact and audits of small entities 
• Concern with non-compliance and significant consequences 
• Agrees with government’s wait and see approach to Clarity Project 
• AUASB should exert influence with IAASB, rather than move in 
different direction with standard setting process 
• More research should be undertaken on the merits of the increased 
regulation in corporate governance 
• Standards are written as for the profession, not as codified legal 
instruments 
 
AUDIT FIRMS-BIG 4 • Oppose additional reporting and administrative reporting 
requirements in relation to independence 
• Concerned about unintended consequences from the legal ASAs 
• Increased audit documentation 
• Concerned about ultimate interpretation by regulators and courts of 
the legal ASAs 
• Overall support to approach 
• Legal professional privilege change to law 
 
AUDIT FIRMS-SME • Do not understand the detail of the new ASAs 
• Increased compliance costs 
• Increased audit documentation 
• Will necessitate staff training 
• Increased time on audits 
 
 
The identified potential costs and benefits of the legally enforceable standards 
from the RIS (April 2006) analysis is as follows: 
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Costs: 
• Auditors/firms may need to revise audit programs. However, the costs 
associated with these changes are no more than for a normal update. 
• Auditors already comply with auditing standards, hence little, if any, 
compliance costs. 
• Any costs will be short term and relate to the first year of compliance. 
 
Benefits: 
• Consistency with existing structure of standards. 
• Changes to ASAs to avoid misinterpretation over the auditor’s obligations. 
• Conformity with ISAs and best international practice. 
3.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANTICIPATED RESULTS 
The public interest theory of regulation holds that government regulation is 
supplied in response to public demand for the correction of inefficient market 
practices and perceived market failure (Posner, 1974; Peltzman at al., 1989). 
Therefore according to the public interest theory the Australian government’s 
intervention in the standard setting process and in making ASAs legally 
enforceable was justified, as it “considered the public interest first and foremost” 
(RIS, April 2006, p. 4) by rectifying the perceived failures in the market for 
accounting information. It is consequently proposed that, 
Research Question 1: The government’s perceived motivation for 
regulatory intervention and making Australian 
Auditing Standards legally enforceable is public 
interest. 
 
 
The Government’s intervention and the resulting move away from the 
previous co-regulatory regime framework for audit standard-setting significantly 
reduced the power and influence of the accounting profession (Jubb and 
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Houghton, 2007). The FRC and AUASB are now the key players, with the 
government appointing key stakeholders from the business and investing 
communities, the professional accounting bodies, governments, and regulatory 
agencies to participate in standard setting (Gaffikin, 2005; Jubb and Houghton, 
2007). According to ‘Self-Regulation’ theory and consistent with ‘Public Interest’ 
theory, the lack of success of self-regulation by the professional bodies is mainly 
due to lack of enforcement powers against non-complying members and that their 
jurisdiction does not cover all firms within the industry (Walker, 1993; Graham, 
1994; Walker and Robinson, 1994;). Given the shifts in regulation power as a 
result of self-regulation being replaced by statutory regulation, it is proposed that 
from the perspectives of the professional bodies and the accounting firms,  
Research Question 2: Reaction to the new audit regime by the professional 
bodies and accounting firms will be negative. 
 
 
The literature (Gaffikin, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2006) implies that governments 
intervene to correct market inefficiencies and that the optimal approach to 
regulation will be evident in increased audit quality. Public confidence in the 
information produced by corporations, and in particular the audit process has been 
undermined by recent corporate failures. CLERP 9 and the legally enforced ASAs 
were introduced to restore public confidence by enhancing the integrity of the 
audit function. The FRC’s strategic direction proposes that the AUASB should 
develop ASAs that are of the highest quality, conform to ISAs and follow 
international best practice (RIS, April 2006). “CLERP 9 reforms have by and 
large raised the bar for the auditing profession and will help regain investors’ 
confidence” (CPA Australia, 2006, p. 10). Accordingly it is proposed that, 
Research Question 3: The benefit of the new audit regime is an increase in 
audit quality and public confidence. 
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The literature (Mitnick, 1980; Gaffikin, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2006) poses that 
government regulation is costless when it is pursued for public interest as a result 
of market failure. In addition, the RIS (April 2006) asserts that there would be 
little, if any, compliance costs to the audit firms. Hence it is proposed,  
Research Question 4: The costs of the new audit regulation will be minimal. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the research method employed to investigate Research 
Questions 1 to 4 posed in Chapter 3. Section 4.2 outlines the research method and 
section 4.3 describes the participants. The approach to data collection and analysis 
of the data are outlined in section 4.4. 
4.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
The research method utilised in this study involved semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with the key stakeholders affected by the new legislative framework. 
This is an exploratory-orientated method and allows the researcher to elicit the 
respondent’s views, feelings and perspectives on the impacts of the new 
legislative framework after the initial year of audits. The form of semi-structured 
in-depth interview encourages participants to share as much information as 
possible in an unconstrained environment, where the interviewer uses a minimum 
of prompts and guiding questions (Cooper and Schindler, 2003) and thus is well 
suited for describing outcomes from the perspective of the key stakeholders. 
4.3 THE PARTICIPANTS 
The stakeholders interviewed represent the key groups affected by the new 
regime of legally backed auditing standards namely; accounting/audit firms, 
professional bodies and regulatory bodies. These are the same stakeholders that 
were consulted in the government’s pre-implementation and consultative phase. 
Senior stakeholder representatives of the target organisations are deemed to be 
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appropriate participants as they are in a position to have an overall understanding 
of the new regulation and its impact.  
Participants were recruited indirectly through a formal approach to the 
participating key stakeholders’ organisations, i.e. the professional and regulatory 
bodies and accounting firms. Contact was made initially through a formal 
approach at the organisation level and each organisation subsequently nominated 
an appropriate representative and facilitated contact between the researcher and 
their representative. Participation was totally voluntary and no incentives were 
offered. 
Audit firms include the Big 4 plus the NSW Audit Office. The NSW Audit 
Office is included as an accounting firm given its responsibility for audits of over 
400 NSW government entities under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 and 
the Corporations Act 2001. Audit office staff are members of either CPA 
Australia or ICAA. Three of the accounting firm participants consisted of two 
partners at each interview, with one a specialist in compliance at the technical 
level, whilst the other a practicing partner familiar with audit engagements. The 
remaining two Big 4 partners interviewed play a key role in the 
assurance/advisory work area and are involved primarily in technical compliance 
issues. Professional bodies’ participants were representatives from CPA Australia, 
ICAA, and IIA. All are in technical advisory roles responsible for their respective 
bodies’ policies, responses to audit regulation and engaging with members and 
government in liaising on these issues. IIA was included as a professional body 
given their involvement with the external auditor and exposure to the ASAs in 
practice. Regulatory bodies’ participants include a recent member of the IAASB 
and an AUASB member, as well as an ASIC representative. The RIS (April 2006) 
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also acquired pre-implementation comments from SMEs. This study does not 
include SMEs as they are still finalising their first year audits under the new 
regime and hence are not in a position to provide fully informed responses until 
January 2008.  
Due to the sensitivity of information, the nature of audit research and the 
small number of stakeholders in the audit environment, the need for anonymity 
was considered of vital importance and assurances were given to those 
interviewed. Table 2 summarises interviewees by applicable code to protect their 
identity, hence preventing the link between the interviewee and the relevant 
organisation within the stakeholder group15. This table also indicates the number 
of interviews conducted within each stakeholder group. 
Table 2: Coding of Each Individual Response Under the Stakeholder 
Category 
 
Key Stakeholder Group Coding of Individual Respondents 
Accounting Firms AF1 AF2 AF3 AF4 AF5 
Professional Bodies PB1 PB2 PB3   
Regulatory Bodies RB1 RB2 RB3   
 
Prior to the agreed interviews, informed consent procedures were either 
emailed or mailed to all respondents. The components included a ‘Participation 
Information Statement’ (Appendix E), ‘Background Information Sheet’ 
(Appendix F), ‘List of Target Issues’ (Appendix G), and a ‘Participation Consent 
Form’ (Appendix H). 
                                                 
 
15  Interviewees under the University of Sydney Ethics requirements, for this study, necessitated 
that interviews cannot be linked directly to the individual or the organisations therefore the 
research was conducted to ensure confidentiality. The nature of the audit environment and the 
stakeholders involved also supports the need for anonymity. Interviewees will be referenced as 
their coding applies and their individual responses can be located in Appendix D. 
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This allowed respondents the opportunity to examine the scope and 
procedures of the project prior to the interview. 
4.4 DATA COLLECTION  
The data collection consisted of semi-structured interviews. In order to gather 
and analyse relevant information systematically a series of issues to guide the 
interview process were identified. The target issues utilised are based on the 
government’s RIS (April 2006), the researcher’s knowledge of the new audit 
regime, discussions with academic colleagues and practicing auditors. The target 
issues (Appendix G) were reviewed for completeness and clarity by two academic 
colleagues with practical and research backgrounds in auditing and an audit 
technical advisor from one of the professional bodies. Where appropriate, their 
suggestions were incorporated.  
The main themes surrounding the perspectives of stakeholders on the impact 
of the new auditing regime are: 
• government’s motivation for legal standards 
• the main costs of the audit regime  
• the main benefits of the audit regime 
• the main impacts on audit methodology 
• the main operational impacts; staff training, compliance 
• audit quality 
• justification of the new audit regime 
 
The list of target issues (Appendix G) was made available to the respondents 
prior to the interview and was explored in the interview to elicit their 
understanding and perceptions of the costs, benefits and direct impacts of legally 
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enforceable auditing standards. Given the semi-structured nature of the 
interviews, the interviewees were able to express themselves without specific 
boundaries or restrictions (Farneti and Guthrie, 2007). They were allowed to 
speak freely. The interviewers steered the interviews to make sure that all target 
issues were covered. Use of issues and non-directional style of questioning 
mitigated any potential interviewer bias. The interview guides were designed to be 
open-ended as possible to allow the interviewee to express their opinions and 
ideas and to further pursue relevant areas of interest. Once the list of target issues 
was covered, interviewers asked if the interviewees had anything further to add 
that might be relevant to the study. All interviews were approximately an hour in 
duration and were recorded on a digital device16 (Table 3). 
The responses of each interview were accordingly summarised under the 
relevant issues and themes as individual stakeholder summaries under the heading 
of Accounting Firms, Professional Bodies and Regulatory Bodies (Appendix C).  
All interviews were conducted over September and October 2007. All the 
interviews but one were carried out in the Sydney CBD at the respective 
stakeholder’s premises. The only exception was a phone interview with a 
stakeholder located in the Melbourne CBD. Table 3 provides a summary of the 
interviews conducted. 
                                                 
 
16  Request to tape interviews were made on the interview day, and there were no objections. 
 CHAPTER  4  │  41 
Table 3: Summary of Interviews  
 
Interview Summary  
Total numbers of interviewees (respondents) 11 
Total number of stakeholder groups represented 3 
Total interview duration 502 mins 
Average interview duration 45 mins 
  
Summary of interviewees by stakeholder group  
Accounting firms (Big 4 and NSW Audit Office) 5 
Professional bodies (CPA Australia, ICAA, IIA) 3 
Regulatory bodies (IASB, ASIC, AUASB) 3 
4.4.1 DATA ANALYSIS 
An interview protocol was established to guide and record the interviews. 
Each interview was attended by at least two researchers, simultaneously taking 
notes. Immediately after each interview, both researchers would collaborate and 
agree on the responses made by the interviewee. These agreed combined 
interpretations were recorded onto handwritten Issues Sheets17, which were used 
to recheck consistency and accuracy of transcripts by each researcher in order to 
circumvent the main disadvantage of in-depth interviews, in that free responses 
are viewed as difficult to analyse (O’Dwyer, 2004).  
The next step was to utilise the digital audio recordings on any issues that 
remained unclear or not consistent in each researcher’s transcription. To add 
further validity to the data collection process, the finalised agreed interview 
interpretations were emailed to the interviewee for review and approval. This 
allowed the interviewee not only to validate the interpretation of the interview, but 
also provided them with an opportunity to refine, clarify, delete or add any further 
                                                 
 
17  Handwritten individual researcher notes, A3 combined notes, and digital interview recordings 
for all interviews can be obtained from the principle researcher upon request. 
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details relevant to the study to ensure no relevant omissions or misinterpretations 
by the researchers. To address the issue of anonymity each participant also 
verified that their name was not linked back to an identifiable organisation. These 
individual interviewee interpretations are located in Appendix D. 
The individual interviewee key relevant data was summarised by one of the 
researchers into ‘Stakeholder Summary’ tables found in Appendix C. The 
summaries were validated by the other researcher and any differences were 
referred onto the third independent academic researcher. This protocol was 
followed for all stakeholder summaries with the final ‘Summary by Stakeholder 
Group’ detailed in Appendix B. 
The key points identified in this chapter frame the process by which the 
current study is guided and data analysed. The following chapter 5 provides the 
results and discussion of the research questions posed in Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the data collected for addressing the relevant issues 
underlying each of the Research Questions 1 to 4 outlined in Chapter 3. The 
summarised responses across stakeholder groups, supplemented by individual 
stakeholders’ responses where appropriate, are discussed and analysed within the 
context of the relevant regulatory theory and the pertinent pre-implementation 
stakeholder conclusions drawn from the RIS (April 2006). Data summary by key 
issues for each individual interview are presented in Appendix D. Each of the 
stakeholder group summary data is located in Appendix C and Appendix B 
summarises the data across the three stakeholder groups (accounting firm, 
professional and regulatory bodies).  
5.2 RESULTS 
Research Question 1 (RQ1) proposed that the government’s motivation in 
introducing legally enforceable ASAs was public interest. As discussed in Chapter 
2, ‘public interest’ theory assumes that the government intervenes to regulate in 
order to protect public interest (as opposed to private interest) from inefficient 
market behaviour and perceived market failure (Posner, 1974; Baker, 2005; 
Gaffikin, 2005). Also, according to the RIS (April 2006) “the main objective was 
to ensure that the new redrafted Auditing Standards consider the public interest 
first and foremost and to produce high quality standards based on ISAs”. 
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The review of the stakeholder responses suggests general agreement that the 
government’s motivation was primarily driven by corporate collapses and the 
need to increase public confidence in Australian financial markets. The 
government’s reaction of removing standard setting away from the profession into 
government regulated legislative and monitoring framework was a means of 
ensuring higher audit quality as a critical ingredient of increase in the level of 
confidence in capital market. The stakeholder responses support RQ1, the ‘public 
interest’ theory explanation for the government intervention and are in alignment 
with the RIS (April 2006). The summarised responses are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Australian Government’s Motivation for Making ASAs Legally 
Enforceable 
Summary by Stakeholder Groups 
 
Accounting Firms Professional Bodies Regulatory Bodies 
• Government under 
pressure to respond to 
corporate collapses 
• Separate standard setting 
from the profession 
• Increase confidence in 
audit quality 
• Access to US markets 
• Government reaction after 
corporate collapses was to 
take standard setting away 
from profession  
• The new regime was 
introduced to regulate 
rather than disable the 
profession 
• Increase confidence in the 
financial market 
• Government response to 
corporate collapses was to 
regulate the profession to 
increase audit quality 
• Ensure global positioning 
in terms of regulatory 
framework and reporting 
 
Although respondents refer to ‘public confidence’ rather than ‘public 
interest’, the overall consensus that the government acted in articulating the 
collective goals of the Australian community post corporate collapses by 
responding with regulation is evident in Table 4. However, individual responses 
(Appendix D) show varying emphasis placed by each of the stakeholder groups on 
different aspects of public confidence as being more important in the Australian 
government’s motivation.  
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The accounting firms’ emphasis can be summed by AF2: “Given the 
corporate collapses there was a perceived need to address the credibility of the 
profession. Government needed to restore confidence in the quality of the audit 
and the introduction of legally enforceable auditing standards and monitoring by 
ASIC was a mechanism to achieve this (that is, take the standard 
setting/enforcement away from the profession)”. 
On the other hand the professional bodies’ emphasis on financial markets 
confidence is articulated by PB1: “The government considered this was also a 
necessary step to enable further participation and access to capital markets”. 
Similarly PB2 suggest that: “Corporate collapses had an impact on market 
confidence in financial reporting and audits and the effectiveness of self-
regulation by the profession was questioned. Government reaction of taking 
standard setting away from the profession and introducing force of law standards 
was a means of increasing the level of confidence in the financial market”. 
The regulatory bodies overall view of the government’s motivation was to 
ensure that Australia is “well positioned internationally in terms of our regulatory 
framework for reporting and audit (i.e. use of standards, status of standards, level 
of inspection” (RB3) by increasing audit quality and regulating the profession. 
This view expressed by the regulatory bodies is similar to their RIS (April 2006) 
pre-implementation position. 
Furthermore, despite an overall consensus by the stakeholders as to the 
motivation for the government’s regulatory intervention, the responses as to 
whether the government’s approach of introducing legally enforceable ASAs is 
justifiable are mixed (refer Table 5).  
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Table 5: Justifiability of the Legally Enforceable Standards 
Summary by Stakeholder Groups 
 
Accounting Firms Professional Bodies Regulatory Bodies 
• Overreaction by the 
government 
• Government needed to 
do something to expand 
audit scope and quality, 
however legal ASAs are 
unlikely to achieve this 
• Duplication of costs in 
terms of inspection/ 
monitoring 
• Perhaps justified given it 
is market driven and a 
response to market 
demand for change to 
standard setting 
• Makes people more 
aware of the audit 
profession, auditing 
standards , world class 
framework and non-
compliance 
consequences 
• Part of a process of 
ensuring Australia’s 
access to capital markets 
• Increase in audit quality 
• Justifiable in terms of 
positioning Australia 
globally in terms of its 
regulatory framework 
and access to capital 
markets 
 
For example, AF4 “believes that government needed to do something that 
would expand audit scope and audit quality, however legally enforceable 
standards are unlikely to achieve this; more in line with satisfying political 
objective”. This comment is representative of the overall view of accounting firms 
and AF5 strongly affirms this stance, “the government overreacted and not sure 
whether the path of legal ASAs is warranted”. This is also reflective of the Big 4 
in their responses to the RIS (April 2006) and their ‘concern with unintended 
consequences’ of the introduction of legally enforceable ASAs. 
In contrast to the accounting firms, the regulatory bodies’ responses affirm 
the government’s justification of legally enforceable ASAs and are aligned with 
their initial stance outlined in the RIS (April 2006): “the approach will increase 
audit quality, increase capital market confidence and will position Australia 
globally”. This is illustrated by RB3’s claim that “Audit quality is the holy grail” 
as justification of the new regime.  
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The professional bodies, on the other hand, remain to be convinced either 
way as illustrated by PB1’s statement; “Perhaps justified given it is market driven 
and a response to market demand for change to standard setting”. PB1 also states 
that “the idea was that Australia would have a world class reporting framework, 
hope that all initiatives have an affect, however they won’t happen overnight”. 
Similarly, PB2 suggests that they “will wait and see whether the government is 
justified in its approach”. 
In conclusion, there appears to be an overall support and consensus for RQ1, 
that is, that the government’s motivation for introducing CLERP 9 and the legally 
enforceable ASAs was one of public interest. However the stakeholder groups 
differ in their views whether the government’s response in making ASAs legally 
enforceable is justifiable as the appropriate regulation choice.  
Research Question 2 (RQ2) proposed that the professional bodies’ and 
accounting firms’ reaction to the new audit regime will be negative. The negative 
reaction was expected as the government intervention in taking the control of 
standard setting away from the profession shifted the balance of power and 
implied that self-regulation was not effective as the profession was no longer seen 
as capable of setting its own standards to protect the public (AUASB, 2005). This 
sentiment was echoed by RB3: “In Australia, traditionally we had two bodies 
(ICAA/CPA Australia with NIA emerging) which promulgated standards and 
regulated themselves. After the corporate collapses, the government took steps to 
increase audit quality and to regulate the audit profession.” 
The data from the stakeholder summary (refer Table 6) illustrates the overall 
negative nature of the firms’ responses and supports RQ2. The audit firms 
consider the legal enforceability of ASAs to be an overreaction and a lack of 
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understanding of the nature of the audit process by the government. According to 
AF4: “Auditing is an art rather than a science” and “is about making judgements 
not about prescriptive legal rules”. 
Table 6: Reaction to the New Regulation 
Summary by Stakeholder Groups  
 
Accounting Firms Professional Bodies Regulatory Bodies 
• Overreaction by 
government 
• Another change 
• Partners opting out of 
profession/ questioning 
continuing as auditors 
• Auditing is about making 
judgements not about 
prescriptive legal rules 
• PB: Additional costs of 
increasing awareness of 
legal ASAs; additional 
training and resources 
• Firms: grudging 
acceptance and a ‘lot of 
moaning’ 
• Overreaction blaming legal 
ASAs for increased costs 
that were really part of 
revised risk standards 
• Audit firms reaction has 
been negative 
• Concern with increase in 
documentation costs  
• Big 4 comfortable with 
compliance but small firms 
lobbying against changes  
 
The negative response of the firms is acknowledged by the regulatory and 
professional bodies. RB3’s statement affirms that there is a “sense of significant 
impact on practitioners (auditors ‘carrying the can’). The number of registered 
auditors is dropping and there have been suggestions that the new regulation is 
an incentive for people to leave the profession”. PB3 also notes “there was a lot 
of moaning” and a “grudging acceptance” (PB1). 
The support for RQ2 is in contrast to the RIS (April 2006), where the 14 
respondents were noted as ‘broadly supportive’ of the legislative proposal and 
legally enforceable standards. Given that the regulatory capture or interest group 
theory suggests that the Australian professional bodies will seek as much control 
as possible over the setting of standards in order to influence legislation, it was 
inevitable that the accounting profession did not want to relinquish the standard 
setting process to the government (Posner, 1974; Walker and Robinson, 1994; 
Walker, 1997; Gaffikin, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2006). 
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Research Question 3 (RQ3) proposed that the benefit of the new audit 
regime is to increase audit quality and public confidence. This aim is implicit in 
the RIS (April 2006) and CPA Australia survey (August 2005) in which four out 
five respondents thought that the new ASAs would improve audit quality even 
though the underlying basis (of auditing) has not changed. However the CPA 
Australia study also highlights that the general public are “unlikely to benefit 
because the reforms do not address the public’s lack of understanding of audit”.  
The stakeholder responses in this study provide limited support for increased 
audit quality, namely by the regulators. Although audit firms admit some benefits 
(refer Table 7), they do not believe that there are any real changes to audit 
outcomes (refer Table 8) and highlight potential risk of increased focus on process 
rather than substance under legally enforceable ASAs. AF2 asserts that “it is 
questionable if there has been any real increase in audit quality. There is no 
change in audit outcomes; mainly the change is in additional rules in relation to 
the process.” AF4 agrees that the “underlying audit process/audit quality remains 
fundamentally the same; however a greater portion of the time is spent on 
documentation which does not necessarily increase audit quality. The increase in 
focus on documentation to ensure legal compliance with form runs a risk of 
process taking over from substance and not identifying significant issues/risks 
requiring judgement.” 
However, there is an agreement that the legally enforceable ASAs have 
forced the profession to refocus and increase consistency and execution of the 
process. According to PB3 there has been some benefit of “greater consistency 
and transferability of skills across auditors and consequently less costs/impacts 
for clients when changing auditors”. PB1 also comments that a benefit of the new 
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regime is that “auditing is seen as an advanced technical specialist skill” and “if 
you are going to audit you need to be serious about it”. Although the stakeholder 
responses provide limited support for increased audit quality, there is no support 
for increased public confidence (refer Table 9 to 11). 
Table 7: Summary of Benefits by Stakeholders  
 
Issue Addressing 
RQ3 
Accounting Firms Professional Bodies Regulatory Bodies 
• The main benefits 
of the new audit 
regime 
• Discipline, refocus 
on profession 
• Increase in 
documentation 
provides 
consistency in 
process, audit 
execution 
• Global 
compatibility 
• “In time we will 
benefit, but not yet” 
• Internationally 
there has been 
recognition that 
audit is an 
advanced technical 
specialist skill 
• Restored 
confidence in 
capital markets 
• More conscientious 
audit process 
leading to an 
increase in audit 
quality in general 
• Clearer linkage 
between non-
compliance and 
consequences 
• Independence of 
standard setting 
from professional 
bodies is positive in 
terms of 
perceptions 
• Transferability of 
skills across 
auditors 
• Increase in audit 
quality 
• Promote 
confidence in 
capital markets 
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Table 8: Main Impact on Audit Practice 
Summary by Accounting Firm Respondents 
 
AF1 AF2 AF3 AF4 AF5 
• Increased 
documentation 
given fear of 
ASIC review 
• No change in 
audit 
outcomes/ 
quality rather 
additional rules 
in terms of 
process 
• No change of 
scope of audit 
work under 
ISAs/ASAs 
• Demonstrate 
compliance 
with ASAs 
• Increased cost 
of 
documentation, 
personnel 
involvement in 
ASIC review 
• Mechanistic 
process to 
ensure 
compliance 
• Focus on form 
and 
documentation 
compliance 
rather than 
increasing 
audit quality 
• Tension 
between using 
audit 
judgement and 
compliance 
with black 
letter 
requirements  
• Less 
flexibility/need 
to comply even 
when risk is 
negligible 
 
The summary of all individual interviewee responses in Tables 9 to 11 
illustrate a consensus that there has been ‘no impact’ on public perception and that 
the government’s prime goal of increasing public and investor confidence has not 
been achieved. In fact, some respondents suggest that it has been detrimental as it 
potentially increased the expectations gap even further.  
Table 9: Impact on Public Perceptions 
Summary by Accounting Firm Respondents 
 
AF1 AF2 AF3 AF4 AF5 
• No difference 
in public 
perception 
• Expectations 
gap potentially 
wider as public 
expectation of 
higher quality 
audit 
• Small investors 
no impact 
• Sophisticated 
investor maybe 
more aware  
• Even 
sophisticated 
investor has 
trouble with 
‘true & fair’, 
and assurance 
• Potential for 
expectation gap 
to widen 
further 
• No real impact 
on broad public 
• Expectations 
gap unlikely to 
be reduced 
• No real impact 
on broad public 
as they 
generally do 
not understand 
audit objective 
or process 
• Capital markets 
may have 
different view 
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Table 10:  Impact on Public Perceptions 
Summary by Professional Bodies Respondents 
 
PB1 PB2 PB3 
• Public is not 
interested  
• There is evidence 
that the expectation 
gap is still alive 
and well  
• The public’s level 
of understanding is 
questionable 
• General public and 
small investors 
‘would not know 
any different’ 
• Professional 
investor (e.g. large 
superannuation 
funds) might have 
an overall 
awareness of 
CLERP reforms as 
a package rather 
than legally 
enforceable ASAs 
specifically 
 
Table 11: Impact on Public Perceptions 
Summary by Regulatory Bodies Respondents 
 
 RB1 RB2 RB3 
Impact on public 
perceptions of 
quality of audits/ 
financial information 
• “I do not think that 
the public care nor 
understand what 
we do” 
• Improvement in 
the quality of an 
audit, 
accountability of 
those charged with 
corporate 
governance 
• The general public 
does not 
distinguish 
between large and 
small audit firms. 
Issues and 
criticisms , 
regardless of the 
size of the firm, 
will have 
significant 
repercussion on 
the overall 
confidence in the 
profession 
 
In conclusion, overall the stakeholder responses fail to support RQ3. This 
result is in line with the ‘political economy of regulation’ theory (Joskow and 
Noll, 1981) according to which ‘public interest’ and regulation acceptance 
depends on public confidence, hence there needs to be an educated effort on 
behalf of the regulator in acquiring acceptance (Gerboth, 1973; Solomons, 1978). 
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Self-regulation theory (Kinney, 2006) and Institutionalist theory (Bealing and 
Baker, 2006) suggest that for the shift in regulation from ‘self-regulation’ to 
‘mandated’ regulation to be accepted, there needs to be a full understanding of the 
objectives of the change in regulation approach. This view is also supported by 
the CPA Australia (2006, p. 6) survey that “the impact on confidence will depend 
on how the new standards are communicated to the public, the capital markets and 
investors”. This is echoed by AF3’s comment that: “external review of profession 
and legally enforceable ASAs should create more confidence in financial 
reporting framework. However, for this to be achieved a balance media reporting 
regarding impact of the process is necessary”. 
PB1 similarly suggests that: “Professional bodies need to do more to increase 
the awareness of the value of an audit ‘a really valuable service that is largely 
unseen”’. PB2’s statement that “regulators/standard setters need to improve 
communication of the benefits of the new regime to the public”, further supports 
this sentiment. 
Research Question (RQ4) proposed that the costs of the new audit regulation 
will be minimal. The RIS (April 2006) did provide initial pre-implementation 
predictions that audit firms may have to revise programs but this would not be 
more significant than a normal update and consequently costs of compliance will 
be minimal. Similarly according to ‘public interest’ theory the government is 
assumed to intervene with minimal costs and burden to business (Brown and 
Tarca, 2001; Uche, 2001; Hantke-Domas, 2003).  
The responses in this study suggest difference of opinion between the 
stakeholder groups. According to the regulators after the initial year of audit the 
costs of compliance are still minimal. In contrast the professional bodies and 
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accounting firms note that there are substantial up front costs of training, mapping 
of methodology to black letter requirements in ASAs as well as continuing 
increased costs of documentation, technical support staff, retention of staff and 
increased costs of compliance in respect to the external ASIC inspection process 
(refer Table 12). 
Table 12:  Costs of New Regime 
 
Summary by 
Stakeholder 
Groups 
Accounting 
Firms 
Professional 
Bodies 
Regulatory 
Bodies 
The main costs of the 
new audit regime 
• Once off 
implementation 
costs of reviewing 
methodology/ 
training and 
ongoing costs of 
documentation 
• Significant 
increase in 
technical resources 
•  Costs of ASIC 
inspection reviews 
• Extra caution in 
terms of increased 
documentation 
under new ASIC 
regime 
• Concern that force 
of law is a 
deterrent to young 
auditors 
progressing to 
partner level 
• More likelihood of 
class actions 
• No significant 
increase in costs if 
complied with 
ASAs prior to 
legalisation 
• Firms using legal 
ASAs as an 
opportunity to 
make audits 
recoverable for 
costs that should 
have been already 
factored in under 
pre-legalised 
ASAs 
• Some initial costs 
of mapping 
methodology to 
ASAs 
• Increase in 
documentation 
costs is not 
attributable to 
legal standards 
Training 
requirements  
for audit staff 
• Increased training 
in terms of 
documentation and 
black letter 
compliance not the 
actual audit  
• Significant 
investment by 
professional 
bodies to ensure 
that members are 
aware and well 
prepared  
• Increased training 
and support 
material 
• Not an applicable 
issue to this 
stakeholder 
Impact/changes on 
other administrative, 
insurance, cultural 
considerations 
• Focus on 
compliance made 
audit less desirable 
as a profession; 
attraction and 
• Not an applicable 
issue to this 
stakeholder 
• Not an applicable 
issue to this 
stakeholder 
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retention of 
personnel an issue 
5.2.1 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
The accounting firms (refer Table 13) also suggest that one of the impacts of 
the increased audit cost has been some tension in auditor/client relationship; 
“clients have been grappling with IFRS compliance/costs and any increase in 
audit fees based on the change of scope under new ASAs is difficult to explain” 
(AF3). The increases of 10-30% in audit costs suggested by a number of firms 
have in fact not been recouped on many engagements.  
However, regulators and professional bodies suggest that the firms are 
blaming increase in fees on legally enforceable standards while in fact these are 
costs of the new ASAs and should have been built into audits some time ago. RB1 
does not “think there is a lot of cost in new regime; the increase in costs is not 
attributable to legal standards, these costs in risk and internal control 
documentation should have been already factored in under the revised pre-
legalised ASAs”. Similarly, PB1 states “practitioners are looking to blame audit 
fee increases on force of law audit standards, when in reality should have been 
raising fees when audit risk standard came out, now under the new regime you 
have to comply, people overreacted to make sure they document everything”. 
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Table 13: Impact on Audit/Client Relations 
Summary by Individual Accounting Firms 
 
AF1 AF2 AF3 AF4 AF5 
• More 
formalised 
relationships/ 
documentation 
of relationship 
and client 
meetings 
• Audit fee 
increased due 
to IFRS/short 
supply of 
auditors/ 
insurance cost 
increases etc. 
rather than 
legally 
enforceable 
ASAs 
• Increase of 10-
30% in cost 
due to 
documentation 
difficult to 
pass onto 
client 
• Some tension 
as increase in 
audit fees due 
to change of 
scope of 
ASAs, hard to 
justify to client 
• Clients still 
grappling with 
IFRS 
compliance 
costs 
• Increase in 
audit fees 
difficult to 
justify as client 
sees no change 
in audit 
outcome 
• Firm has not 
been able to 
recover costs 
of compliance 
• Some 
mandatory 
requirements 
are trivial and 
of client 
nuisance value 
• Direct costs 
increased by 
15% on average 
• More frequent 
communication 
with client on 
increased 
number of issues 
• Increased profile 
with some 
clients 
 
The accounting firms appear to differentiate between the costs of new ASAs 
and legal enforceability of ASAs, but they clearly attribute some additional costs 
to the new regime; “Costs regarding framework for ensuring continual 
compliance” (AF3), “Increased costs (10-30 %) due to documentation” (AF2) 
and “increased documentation and compliance has placed pressure to work 
additional hours” (AF5). 
Other cost increases specific to the new regime (refer RQ4 results discussion) 
relate to the loss of flexibility and judgement and mandatory performance of 
procedures that would have been considered unnecessary or of limited value. AF5 
implies that there is “tension between using audit judgement and complying with 
black letter requirements (process vs. objective). Less flexibility to changes in 
circumstances as need to comply with mandatory requirements even when risk is 
negligible.” Research by Buffini (2006) predicts that audit fees will rise as a 
consequence of CLERP 9 reform and Andrews (2006) hypothesised that small 
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firms will opt out of the audit market support firm’s comments on the additional 
costs of the new regime.  
Another significant issue of the new regime relates to ASIC’s monitoring of 
compliance with legally enforceable standards and the penalties for non-
compliance. The summary of accounting firms’ views of penalties in Table 14 
illustrates the level of uncertainty as to the likely consequences of non-compliance 
in terms of penalties. However, overall perception appears to be that this aspect of 
the new regulatory framework is very significant. PB3 concludes, “yet to see 
whether this legislation has ‘any teeth’ before it has a reputation”. However all 
firms appear to be taking this seriously by implementing controls to ensure 
compliance in order to manage firm and individual (partner) risk exposures. 
Table 14: Penalties and Compliance 
Summary of Accounting Firm Responses 
 
 AF1 AF2 AF3 AF4 AF5 
The process 
of enforcing/ 
monitoring 
compliance 
with the 
auditing 
standards 
• Global 
methodology 
supplemented 
by Australian 
compliance 
checklist 
• ASIC review 
in process 
• Some 
uncertainty; 
clarification 
in time with 
ASIC 
inspections 
• Threat of 
ASIC 
inspection 
and shaming 
for non-
compliance 
made a 
difference 
• Firm has 
extensive 
compliance 
regime, no 
real change 
in controls 
• Internal and 
external 
reviews 
Penalties for 
non-
compliance 
• To be dealt 
with as and 
when 
necessary 
• Penalties 
taken 
seriously 
before and 
perception 
that maybe 
outcome no 
different 
• Different 
interpretations 
in terms of 
jailable 
offence or 
fines 
• Uncertain as 
to how ASIC 
will deal with 
non-
compliance 
• Significant 
consequence 
of non-
compliance 
in negative 
press 
coverage and 
reputation 
loss  
• Fines and 
disciplinary 
action 
involved 
• Unclear as to 
how courts 
will interpret 
the ASAs 
and non-
compliance 
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5.3 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this research was to contribute towards an understanding of the 
impacts of the introduction of the CLERP 9 audit regulation, and in particular the 
new force of law auditing standards on the audit profession by examining and 
complimenting the investigative pre-implementation RIS (April 2006) with post-
implementation data. The data collected and reported in this study makes a 
significant contribution to the regulator’s and audit profession’s understanding of 
the effects on the key stakeholders and provides useful guidance in relation to 
actual costs, benefits and other operational impacts.  
In summary, the findings indicate a number of significant differences between 
perceived pre-implementation costs, benefits of the new regime to what the 
respondents have portrayed as their experience after the first year of audit. The 
data also illustrates that the impact and perspectives of different stakeholder 
groups are not uniform. For example, the stakeholder groups support the public 
interest notion as the motivation behind the government’s introduction of the 
legally enforceable standards, however the emphasis as to what this means varies 
between the groups. Accounting firms and professional bodies place more 
emphasis on separation of the standard setting from the profession as a response 
to corporate collapses whilst regulatory bodies place more emphasis on increasing 
confidence in capital markets. Furthermore, in contrast to the regulatory bodies, 
the profession does not consider that the extra burden of the legally enforceable 
ASAs has increased audit quality or public confidence. According to the firms, the 
additional significant costs of increased documentation, training, monitoring and 
reviews have not met the government’s desired objectives of ‘upholding public 
interest, conformity with ISAs and high quality ASAs’ (RIS, April 2006, p1). 
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In conclusion, the data collected in this study does not provide strong support 
for the Australian government’s introduction of the legally enforceable standards 
as an appropriate response to achieve an increase in the quality of audits. 
However, the findings in this study need to be appropriately placed and 
understood within the context of the new regime’s relatively short term 
implementation time frame. The long term impacts may change and this cannot be 
ascertained until some time into the future after several years of audits undertaken 
under the current regime. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the contributions and limitations of this study, as well as 
presenting a number of suggestions for future research. Section 6.2 restates the 
main findings of the research and its contributions. Section 6.3 outlines the main 
limitations and section 6.4 provides some directions for future research.  
6.2 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study examined the initial stages of the implementation of legally 
enforceable ASAs and provides valuable insights into the impacts of the first year 
of compliance across key stakeholders. The results of this study will be of interest 
to accounting firms as they address the challenges of compliance and associated 
costs. Professional bodies will benefit from this feedback in terms of future 
directions in supporting their members with training and updates on standards. 
The results will also be of interest to standard setters as this study provides useful 
insights to inform the second phase of reviewing ASAs impacts to “consider any 
potential improvements” (RIS, April 2006, p. 10). The importance and value of 
this study has been visible throughout the data collection, where accounting firm 
respondents and the professional bodies in particular, were keen to see how the 
new regime collaborative post-implementation impact was reflected across the 
firms. 
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6.3 LIMITATIONS 
The study’s results must be considered in light of a number of limitations. 
Firstly, the use of an semi-structured interview research method reduces the 
external validity of the study, that is, generalisation to different settings, such as 
firms other than the Big 4. However, given the limited quantitative data at this 
early stage of the implementation of the new audit regime, qualitative data from 
semi-structured in-depth interviews with the key stakeholders affected by the new 
legislative framework was the most appropriate method to capture these initial 
insights which provide a useful snapshot of practice and the impacts.  
Secondly, there is the potential of interviewer bias as there are many factors 
that may influence interviews, such as influence on the answers, interviewer not 
probing properly, intentional subversion by the interviewer (Neumann, 1995) and 
there are possible errors that may occur in the recording process (Cooper and 
Schindler, 1991). The potential interviewer bias was addressed by maintaining a 
disciplined and systematic protocol (Lillis, 2002) encouraging data around the 
themed key issues relevant to the identified research questions (refer section 
4.4.1). Each interview was attended by at least two researchers, simultaneously 
taking notes and both researchers would collaborate and agree on the responses 
made by the interviewee. This interview protocol was further extended by 
emailing the agreed interview interpretations to the interviewee for review and 
approval increasing the validity of the process. This allowed each interviewee not 
only to validate the interpretation of the interview, but also provided them with an 
opportunity to refine, clarify, delete or add any further details relevant to the study 
to ensure no relevant omissions or misinterpretations by the researchers. 
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Finally, findings of the this study are limited to Big 4 accounting firms and 
may not be representative of the impact on smaller and mid tier firms (that is, 
SMEs). The audits of SMEs will not be finalised for another two months and 
therefore the full impact is not evident yet. 
6.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
The current study has identified a number of views as to the impact of the 
new regime of legally enforceable ASAs. The diversity in perspectives leads to a 
number of important considerations for future research. Future studies could 
address the differential impacts of the new regime between the Big 4, middle tier 
and smaller firms. The current study focused on initial implementation impacts 
which may change with time, hence future studies need to consider longer term 
impacts after several audit periods. Jubb and Houghton (2007) suggest that future 
research into CLERP 9 implementation impacts and the efficacy of reforms 
should utilise existing financial reporting models based on earnings management 
levels, earnings response coefficients and modified audit opinions. 
Another important consideration in terms of practice and standard setting is 
how much of the initial costs of compliance are due to legal enforceability of 
ASAs and how much can be attributed to changes in ASAs. This may provide 
insights into the likely burden of future changes to ISAs/ASAs and the ‘Clarity 
Project’ for the profession. Future long term studies could also address and 
measure audit quality in terms of audit opinions, outcomes of ASIC inspections 
and the number of prosecutions to provide the profession and standard setters with 
significant insights as to whether this type of regulatory intervention is justified 
and effective in terms of its objective.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A:  Summary of the Relevant Regulation Theory Literature 
 
Year Author Focus of Research Research Perspective Insights and Contributions 
1958 Bator The anatomy of market 
failure 
Market efficiency  Provides insight into the market failure concept. 
Relevant to public regulation theory in assisting to explain the reason for 
government intervention. 
1971 Stigler Theory of economic 
regulation  
Economic theory 
‘Chicago School of 
Positivists’ 
Develops the economic theory of regulation integrating politics and 
economy. Extends the rational economists behaviour to regulation. 
Challenges the public interest theory and adds a slightly different twist to 
Capture Theory from an economist’s view; in that regulation results from 
the demands of interest groups. However fails to examine the effects of 
these demands on the consumers and other groups within the regulatory 
process. 
1973 Gerboth Politics in accounting inquiry Political economics Politicization of accounting rule making is inevitable and depends on 
public confidence for it to be perceived as successful in achieving 
objectives. 
1974 Posner Economic theory of 
regulation 
Economic theory and public 
choice theory 
Highlights practical and relevant issues to economic regulation theory 
looking at taxation regulation in particular. Asserts that the central reason 
for government regulation is market failure. Dismisses Public Interest 
theory in its current form and provides an economist’s view of an adequate 
positive theory of regulation. 
1976 Cobb, Ross & 
Ross 
Political process and the 
public interest 
Agenda building Develop and use an agenda building model to produce a framework from 
which to examine policy making processes. Jones et al (2004) use this 
model to explain the tensions among various groups within society that 
compete to places issues on the agenda of political policy making. 
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Year Author Focus of Research Research Perspective Insights and Contributions 
1976 Joskow Government regulation  Political economy of 
regulation 
Examines the regulatory activities of government agencies to explain the 
political tensions between the government agencies. 
1978 Solomons Impact of politics on 
accounting standards 
Political motivations in 
standard setting 
Insight into why standard setting is a social and political decision. The 
process for standard setting is political as there is an educational effort 
involved in acquiring acceptance for a new standard. 
1978 Watts & 
Zimmerman 
Accounting theories Positive approach Adopted an interest group approach to regulation in the context of 
examining the demand and supply for accounting theories and the market 
for making excuses. 
1979 Peltzman Theory of economic 
regulation 
Economic theory 
‘Chicago School of 
Positivists’ 
Toward a more general theory of regulation examines the interest in the 
effects of government regulation and voting and the interaction between 
wealth distribution and efficiency. 
1980 Mitnick Political economy of 
regulation  
Economic welfare Regulation can be understood in terms of an agency relations, political 
relations, framework developed for government intervention. 
1981 Joskow & Noll Regulation theory in practice Political economy of 
regulation  
Provide insight into political economy of regulation in line with their 
support of the public interest theory of regulation. The research into public 
regulation of the utilities organisations reveal that economic disruptions 
change the distribution of political power, and as a result have the view that 
economic theory of regulation should be integrated with other theories such 
as public interest. 
1982 Breyer Regulation and its reform Government intervention Develops a framework for government intervention; reform-efficiency and 
consumer equity are main areas of concern. There are certain conditions for 
government intervention, mainly when unrestrained competition does not 
work well. 
1982 Mitnick Regulation and agency theory Agency theory Regulation can be understood in terms of an agency relation and regulating 
accounting standards is a solution to the agency problem. Further develops 
the research from 1980 on agency theory. 
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Year Author Focus of Research Research Perspective Insights and Contributions 
1983 Cooper & Keim Corporate financial 
disclosure regulation 
Financial disclosure Examine failure in financial reporting and disclosure as the need for 
regulation. Insight into market failures highlighting the issues of public 
goods that are free for some.  
1983 
& 
1986 
Becker Regulation, pressure groups 
and public interest theory of 
regulation  
Public choice, political 
influences 
Furthering works by Posner (1974), Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1979), using 
the economic approach to explain political choices, influences and 
regulation. Model testing the competition between interests based on 
economic theory and public interest theory; concludes that regulation is 
used to increase the welfare of the most influential interest group. 
1984 Tinker Theories of the state Neoclassical state theory There are many social factors that need to be considered in any analysis of 
theory of regulation. Existence of social inequalities is required to be 
balanced by government regulation. 
1984 Laughlin & 
Willmott 
Accounting regulation  Critical perspective Analysis of self interest and world views within accounting regulation. 
Recognises the structure of social relations with both the users and setters 
of accounting standards. 
1984 Keeler Theories of regulation  Economic or specialist 
interest  
Adapts Peltzman’s (1979) model to explain regulatory policies and changes 
and asserts that a rational regulator could easily behave in the public 
interest. Examines adapted model in industries that have been deregulated. 
1987 Walker ASRB case study Political activity and 
regulatory capture 
This case study review provides evidence of the Australian standard setting 
process; suggests that ASRB was captured by interest groups it was to 
regulate. This research adds to the ‘Capture Theory’ literature. 
1987 Puxty, Willmott, 
Cooper & Lowe 
Modes of regulation in 
advanced capitalism 
Critical and with a social 
context 
The authors focus on the roles of accounting in regulating economic and 
social activities in society by examining four countries UK, Sweden, USA 
and West Germany. Research provides a framework for examining 
regulation issues within a broader view of the theory of regulation. 
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Year Author Focus of Research Research Perspective Insights and Contributions 
1989 Peltzman, Levine 
& Noll 
Theory of economic 
regulation 
Economic theory 
‘Chicago School of 
Positivists’ 
Further extends the work of Stigler (1971) and looks into the economic 
theory in light of deregulated airline and railroad industries. Looks towards 
a more general theory of regulation. 
1990 Booth & Cocks Accounting standard setting Critical approach to standard 
setting 
Examines the issues in standard setting and reflects on the lobbying groups 
that affect the process. 
1990 Laffont & Tirole Theory of regulatory capture Agency theoretical approach The authors contribute to the literature on interest group politics in 
regulation and develop an agency theoretical approach to understanding 
government decision making. 
1992 Makkai & 
Braithwaite 
Modes of regulation  Capture theory of regulation  Their examination of Australian nursing homes reveals that inspectors with 
prior senior management experience in the industry tend to be lax in 
regulation enforcement. 
1993 Laffont & Tirole Government and regulation  Incentive theory Examines the economic reasons behind the government’s role in regulation. 
1993 Shavell Regulation and enforcement Legal perspective Examines the optimal structure of law enforcement; to balance the social 
costs arising from imperfect enforcement to the administrative costs of 
enforcement. 
1993 Walker Accounting and auditing 
regulation  
Critical Examines the processes used to administer compliance with accounting and 
auditing rules, highlighting the regulation and the profession and their 
relationships. This paper highlighted that the Australian government back 
in the 1980s withdrew from the regulation of accounting and placed 
reliance on the accounting profession to self-regulate-these arrangements 
are looked at as failures in regulation. 
1994 Ogus Effective self regulation  Legal perspective The public interest and the private interest theory approach to regulation are 
useful together in focusing attention on how the different institutions of 
regulatory decision-making can be used either to advance the ostensible 
goals of regulation or else to subvert those goals to private ends. Argues 
that economic analysis plays a role in regulation approach. 
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Year Author Focus of Research Research Perspective Insights and Contributions 
1994 Walker & 
Robinson 
Development of financial 
disclosure rules 
Regulation of accounting Case study reviewing the participation of public-sector and private-sector 
agencies in financial accounting standard setting. Explores that the relations 
between public and private agencies are at times pursuing self-interests, 
creating turbulence. During 1985-1992, the accounting profession viewed 
the government intrusion into standard setting as unwelcome. 
1995 Zeff History of standard setting Regulation of accounting Provides a comparative history of accounting between US, UK and 
Australia. 
1997 Majone Regulation  Institutional public choice 
theory 
Examines the causes and consequences of change in governance and 
regulation in the democratic political institution.  
1998 Zeff Views on standard setting Regulation of accounting, in 
particular auditing 
Provides some useful views on CLERP 9 in Australia, comparing it to the 
US experience of the PCAOB and SOX. 
1999 Baldwin & Cave Understanding regulation 
theory 
Fundamentals of regulation Highlights practical and relevant issues of regulation theory examining 
questions such as; why regulate, what strategies work best, self-regulation, 
and concludes that understanding regulation calls for a multidisciplinary 
approach. 
1999 Laffont Regulation theory Economic perspective Examines theory of government regulation and how it is translated into 
practice. Claims that regulators need to understand the principles of 
regulation to explain their decisions, develop solutions and to communicate 
the benefits to the regulatee. 
1999 Majone Regulation Institutional public choice 
theory 
Examines the regulatory state and its legitimacy issues. Regulation as a 
mode of policy making; examines the Europeanization of British policy-
making. The issues of credibility, public control underpin the government’s 
success in regulation; democratic public parties have short term periods and 
regulation is often needed for the long term to be effective. 
2000 Den Hertog General theories of regulation Economic perspective Makes the distinction between public interest theories, the Chicago theory 
of regulation and public choice theories - adds to the labeling and 
evaluation of the theories , analysing their merits and limitations. 
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Year Author Focus of Research Research Perspective Insights and Contributions 
2000 Croley Public interest regulation  Banking and finance Examines the issues around regulatory agencies being in a better position to 
provide broad based interests with beneficial regulation. 
2000 Ravlic Standard setting and auditor 
independence 
Political overview Highlights issues with the monitoring of compliance regulation, in respect 
of the independence audit reforms. 
2001 Brown & Tarca Politics, process and the 
future of accounting 
standards 
Public interest and private 
interest 
Examine the future of Australian accounting standard setting, concluding 
that the regulation of accounting standards has been captured by the 
interests of the IAASB. Adopt perspective of public interest and interest 
group theories to argue that government intervention in accounting and 
auditing regulation is seen as a low cost solution to increase capital market 
confidence. 
2001 Collett, Godfrey 
& Hrasky 
International harmonisation Political  Provide insights into the political drivers of regulation which conflict with 
the fundamental reasons for the reform currently facing accounting 
standard setters. 
2001 Mitnick Uses of regulation and 
deregulation 
Benefits of regulation  Provides insight into regulatory benefits for firms in managing those 
regulatory transitions. 
2001 Ramsey Auditor independence Regulation reform Review of current Australian independence of auditors and requirements 
and proposed reform to auditor independence and monitoring of 
compliance. 
2001 Uche Theory of regulation  Banking and finance Provides a review of the public interest and capture theories of regulation 
within a banking industry context. Contributes to the notion that regulation 
serves different purposes for different interest groups on different 
occasions. Concludes that there is a change in the concept of public good 
and that the theories are all intertwined. 
2003 Clarke & Dean Conceptual framework Critical approach  Attention needs to be given to accounting and its fundamentals rather than 
the unfruitful efforts to create the optimal conceptual framework. 
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Year Author Focus of Research Research Perspective Insights and Contributions 
2003 Hantke-Domas Regulation theory and 
welfare economics 
Public interest Examines the interpretation of public interest theory and concludes that it 
has merits along the lines of economic welfare and that regulation seeks the 
protection and benefit of public at large. 
2003 Jones & Wolnizer Harmonisation and 
conceptual framework 
Critical approach Examine both harmonisation and conceptual framework and the issues 
around globally acceptable accounting standards. 
2004 Jones, Rahman & 
Wolnizer 
Accounting reform in 
Australia 
Political agenda building Using political agenda building framework by Cobb et al (1976) conclude 
that the government’s CLERP 9 proposals were superior to the accounting 
profession’s attempts to bring changes to standard setting. 
2005 Cooper & Deo Australian corporate reforms Foucauldian and capture 
theory of regulation  
Use of Foucauldian theoretical framework to examine how past events have 
shaped the future of Australian corporate regulation. Concludes that flaws 
are not with the regulation legislation but with a system that allows 
interested parties to control the regulatory process. 
2005 Baker Ideology of the US public 
accounting profession 
Public interest theory of 
regulation  
Emphasises the importance of regulation of capital markets through 
auditing and financial accounting standards setting and reveals the inability 
of the accounting profession and researchers in determining what the 
meaning of public interest is. 
2005 Gaffikin Theory of regulation Public interest Reviews the various theories and approaches to regulation within the 
Australian context and provides insights into the various perspectives used 
to explain the interplay of political, economic and social forces, that all 
influence the regulation on accounting practice. 
2005 Godfrey & 
Langfield-Smith 
Globalisation of accounting 
standards 
Capture theory Examine globalisation of accounting standards, adoption of IFRS, and 
conclude that the political and regulatory influences are explained by 
regulatory capture theory. 
2005 Grajzl & Murrell Government regulation  Legal and economic Examines the implications of self regulation versus government regulation, 
in the context of history of law practice. 
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Year Author Focus of Research Research Perspective Insights and Contributions 
2005 Kinney Trends in regulation of audit 
in the US context 
Self-regulation to mandated 
regulation  
Explores trends in audit regulation in the US from 1981-2005; non-
mandated value–adding assurance services of the 1990s to statutory 
adoption of independent regulation and government sanctioned corporate 
governance role for auditors in 2005. Provides implications of the last 25 
years for the future researcher, student and concludes that there is a shift 
from self-regulation theory to understanding of external regulation. 
2006 Andrews Commentary on audit 
regulation  
Regulation impacts Examines issues that the new force of law auditing standards are predicted 
to force up audit fees. 
2006 Bealing & Baker SOX and its real impact Institutionalist theory Examines the role of the accounting profession and SEC in protecting the 
investing public after corporate collapses. They examine the changes of 
regulation in the US and challenges the need to bring together a more 
effective legal and regulatory regime.  
2006 Buffini Commentary on audit 
regulation 
Reform Examines the issues around documentation given ASIC role in monitoring 
of compliance with ASAs (media commentary). 
2006 Gaffikin Standardised accounting 
practice 
Public interest Provides insights into the current Australian accounting regulation. 
2007 Clarke & Dean Misleading financial 
disclosures of corporations 
Effective reform Propose that accounting reforms are still not addressing the fundamental 
problems of ‘indecent disclosure’; debate on reform effectiveness, 
principle-based versus rules-based regulation, true and fair views, 
accounting standards compliance, etc. 
2007 Dick & Walton IASB Agenda for audit and 
accounting standards 
Reform Examine the agenda of the IASB and note that the academic community is 
not contributing much to assist with the IASB research projects such as 
revenue recognition, conceptual framework, financial statement 
presentation and other research issues related to current standard setting. 
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Year Author Focus of Research Research Perspective Insights and Contributions 
2007 Jubb & Houghton Auditing regulation  Regulation efficacy Review the current post-CLERP 9 standard setting reforms in the 
Australian environment. Examine the relationships between the regulatory 
stakeholders and provides an insight into the current role and activities of 
the AUASB and FRC, as well as an update on the IAASB Clarity Project.  
2007 Morgan & Yeung Law and regulation  Legal  These researchers draw upon their legal and social backgrounds to provide 
useful insights into regulation and the law. They explore the role of public 
and private actors in the enforcement of regulation, adding to the regulation 
debate that its sole purpose is to influence human and institutional 
behaviour. 
2007 Simnett IAASB developments Critical review Examines the role of the IAASB and its impact on Australian legally 
enforceable auditing standards in Australia including concerns with 
IAASB’s Clarity Project. 
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Appendix B:  Issue Summary by Stakeholder Group 
 
Issues Accounting Firms Professional Bodies Regulatory Bodies 
Australian Government’s 
motivation/reasons in 
making Auditing Standards 
legally enforceable 
• Government under pressure to respond 
to corporate collapses 
• Separate standard setting from the 
profession 
• Increase confidence in audit quality 
• Access to US markets 
• Government reaction after corporate 
collapses was to take standard setting 
away from profession  
• The new regime was introduced to 
regulate rather than disable the 
profession 
• Increase confidence in the financial 
market 
• Government response to corporate 
collapses was to regulate the 
profession to increase audit quality 
• Ensure global positioning in terms of 
regulatory framework and reporting 
Main impact(s) of the legally 
enforceable standards for 
your audit practice 
• No change in audit outcomes/ quality 
• Mechanistic process/focus on form and 
documentation compliance rather than 
increasing audit quality 
• Highlighted awareness of auditing as 
“advanced technical specialist skill” 
• Professional bodies play role in 
monitoring and ensuring compliance 
• Increase documentation requirements 
• Struck fear into small practitioners 
given new penalty regime 
• No change to ASAs other than 
replacing ‘should’ with ‘shall’ 
• Scrutiny of methodology to ensure 
compliance with standards 
Reaction to the new 
regulation 
• Overreaction by government 
• Another change 
• Partners opting out of profession/ 
questioning continuing as auditors 
• Auditing is about making judgements 
not about prescriptive legal rules 
• PB: Additional costs of increasing 
awareness of legal ASAs; additional 
training and resources 
• Firms: grudging acceptance and a ‘lot 
of moaning’ 
• Overreaction blaming legal ASAs for 
increased costs that were really part of 
revised risk standards 
• Audit firms approach has been 
negative 
• Concern with increase in 
documentation costs  
• Big 4 comfortable with compliance but 
small firms lobbying against changes  
 APPENDICES  │  73 
Issues Accounting Firms Professional Bodies Regulatory Bodies 
Impact of the legally 
enforceable standards on 
firm’s audit methodology 
• No change in methodology 
• Global audit methodology 
supplemented by Australia’s 
compliance checklist meets all 
requirements 
• No much change in standards, e.g. 
‘should’ replaced by ‘shall’ 
• Review methodology/programs to 
ensure compliance with ASAs 
• Ensures that firms revisit their audit 
methodology and comply with the 
ASAs in order to drive a better audit 
Training requirements for 
audit staff 
• Increased training in terms of 
documentation and black letter 
compliance not the actual audit  
• Significant investment by professional 
bodies to ensure that members are 
aware and well prepared  
• Increased training and support material 
 
Impact/changes to audit 
planning process 
• No real change other than focus on 
form filling and documentation of 
rationale of judgements 
• More resources spent on planning 
considerations , risk assessment and 
addressing the risk in the audit 
• Legalisation of ASAs did not change 
the audit process, audit changes are 
caused by aligning ASAs to ISAs 
• More overt documentation of risks and 
controls 
 
Impact/changes in the 
focus/importance placed on 
the assessment of the client’s 
internal controls 
• No real change, just increase in 
mandatory documentation 
• Internal control assessment must be 
done prior to determining audit 
approach 
 
Impact on audit/client 
relations 
• No material impact 
• Increase in audit fees difficult to justify 
as client sees no change in audit 
outcome 
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Issues Accounting Firms Professional Bodies Regulatory Bodies 
Impact/change in the firm’s 
approach/criteria to identify 
areas requiring more/less 
audit effort 
• Underlying audit process the same 
• More time spent on documentation  
• Audit effort has increased mainly in 
terms of documentation  
• Some additional requirements, e.g. 
revenue recognition 
 
Impact of new regime on 
level of audit effort generally 
and/or in specific areas 
• Underlying audit process the same 
• Need to manage risk of checklist 
mentality approach 
• More time spent on audit overall as a 
result of increased documentation 
 
Impact/changes on other 
administrative, insurance, 
cultural considerations 
• Focus on compliance made audit less 
desirable as a profession; attraction and 
retention of personnel an issue 
 
 
 
The main costs of the new 
audit regime 
• going costs of documentation 
• Significant increase in technical 
resources 
• Costs of ASIC inspection reviews 
• Extra caution in terms of increased 
documentation under new ASIC 
regime 
• Concern that force of law is a deterrent 
to young auditors progressing to 
partner level 
• More likelihood of class actions 
• No significant increase in costs if 
complied with ASAs prior to 
legalization 
• Firms using legal ASAs as an 
opportunity to make audits recoverable 
for costs that should have been already 
factored in under pre-legalised ASAs 
• Some initial costs of mapping 
methodology to ASAs 
• Increase in documentation costs is not 
attributable to legal standards 
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Issues Accounting Firms Professional Bodies Regulatory Bodies 
The main benefits of the new 
audit regime 
• Discipline, refocus on profession 
• Increase in documentation provides 
consistency in process, audit execution 
• Global compatibility 
• “In time we will benefit, but not yet”  
• Internationally there has been 
recognition that audit is an advanced 
technical specialist skill 
• Restored confidence in capital markets 
• More conscientious audit process 
leading to an increase in audit quality 
in general 
• Clearer linkage between non-
compliance and consequences 
Independence of standard setting from 
professional bodies is positive in terms 
of perceptions 
• Transferability of skills across auditors 
• Increase in audit quality 
• Promote confidence in capital markets 
Impact on different size 
firms (i.e. Big 4 vs. SMEs) 
• Difficult to contemplate how SMEs 
will cope given their limited resources  
• Some smaller firms may opt out of 
audit profession due to costs of 
compliance 
• Minimal impact on Big 4 as have 
resources and international 
methodology already in compliance 
with ISAs 
• Mid tier audit firms; significant impact 
on quality control and independence 
compliance systems  
• Small firms are still in the process of 
adjusting to change and ensuring 
compliance of methodology with 
ASAs 
• Big 4 part of global network and have 
the resources, thus only marginal 
impact 
• SMEs do not have the resources for 
training and updates on methodology 
and more work to ensure compliance is 
to be expected 
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Issues Accounting Firms Professional Bodies Regulatory Bodies 
The process of 
enforcing/monitoring 
compliance with the auditing 
standards 
• Firm has compliance regime 
• ASIC reviews in process 
• Threat of non-compliance  
• Each breach is 50 penalty points where 
each point equates to $110 under the 
Crimes Act  
• Introduction of new ASIC inspection 
program has added to the already 
existing monitoring costs 
• Big 4 have compliance checklists in 
place  
Penalties for non-compliance • Consequence of non-compliance and 
reputation loss significant 
• Not clear as to how the courts will 
interpret ASA non-compliance 
• Many not aware of correct penalty-no 
jail time just fines, it is ‘victimless 
crime’ 
• Not clear how the courts will interpret 
the ASAs and the repercussions from 
criminal actions 
• Yet to see whether this legislation has 
“any teeth” 
• Consequence of non-compliance and 
reputation biggest deterrent 
• No clear on ASIC penalties 
Impact on public perceptions 
of quality of audits/ financial 
information 
• No real impact on broad public or even 
sophisticated investor as they generally 
do not understand audit objective or 
process 
• Expectations gap unlikely to be 
reduced but may widen further 
• Public is not interested  
• There is evidence that the expectation 
gap is still alive and well 
• The public’s level of understanding is 
questionable 
• No real impact on general public as 
they do not understand audit process or 
objectives 
• Improved audit quality 
 
Clarity of Auditing 
Standards 
• Clarity Project should improve clarity 
• No great confidence or perceived 
impact yet 
• IASB adding further black letter 
requirements are likely to increase the 
burden of compliance 
• Practitioners need to have a period of 
time without changes to be able to 
cope with demands of the new regime 
before Clarity Project effect 
• Questionable whether the quality of 
audit standards will be improved  
• More black letter requirements and 
duplication  
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Issues Accounting Firms Professional Bodies Regulatory Bodies 
Justifiability of the legally 
enforceable standards 
• Overreaction by the government 
• Government needed to do something to 
expand audit scope and quality, 
however legal ASAs are unlikely to 
achieve this 
• Duplication of costs in terms of 
inspection/ monitoring 
• Perhaps justified given it is market 
driven and a response to market 
demand for change to standard setting 
• Makes people more aware of the audit 
profession, auditing standards , world 
class framework and non-compliance 
consequences 
• Part of a process of ensuring 
Australia’s access to capital markets 
• Increase in audit quality 
• Justifiable in terms of positioning 
Australia globally in terms of its 
regulatory framework and access to 
capital markets 
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